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Abstract	  	  
Sudan has been politically unstable for most of its post independence period as it 
suffered Africa’s longest civil war. The country was ‘made in error’ because its borders 
attempted to amalgamate alienated groups of nations with little if anything in common. 
The South did not identify with the Arab led Sudanese society.  It had fought for an 
autonomous model of governance since Sudan’s birth in 1956. Among the Southerners 
there were the advocates for outright secession and advocates for a united Sudan with a 
decentralized model of governance.  After two short federal experiments, the first during 
the period 1972-1981 initiated by The Addis Ababa Agreement, and the second 2005-
2011 initiated by The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the South opted for secession. In 
2011, the South overwhelmingly voted for secession and formed Africa’s newest nation, 
the Republic of South Sudan. The contention of this thesis is that the South’s 
achievement of secession is a result of multiple factors. The impact of the centre’s 
policies, the weakness of the democratic governments, the failure of the peace processes, 
the existence of historical grievances, and the role of international actors constitute these 
factors. After providing some of the theoretical literature on secessionist movements, the 
thesis will focus on the case of Sudan. Through data analysis of primary and secondary 
sources and field research interviews the paper will provide the rationale of the thesis.  
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"O mankind! We have created you from a male and a female, 
and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one 
another.” 
[Al Hujurat: 13 - The Quran] 
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Introduction	  	  	  
There are many reasons Sudan is a compelling country to study. Sudan, until 
recently, was Africa’s and the Arab world’s largest country. It is also the cradle of the 
worlds’ longest river, the Nile, and the Sudanese government exerts authority over the 
river’s tributaries, the Blue and White Niles. Additionally, the country is endowed with 
astonishing resources ranging from fertile land to minerals and oil. Sudan’s oil reserves 
were estimated to be among the richest in the continent and its potential agricultural 
products are considered enough to eradicate hunger in all of Africa.   
Sudan’s location makes it an intriguing country. Located in northeast Africa, the 
country is where the Islamic-Arab civilization and the African ones intersect. By 
disposition, the country was predestined to house diverse groups of people.  The advent 
of British colonizers and the European missionaries added to this diversity. This made the 
Sudanese national an African, an Arab, a Muslim, a Christian, an animist, a secular, 
and/or a Shariah-law observant.   
The politicisation of some of these identities led to international ramifications that 
placed Sudan at the centre of the ‘War on Terror.’ Since Sudan’s independence in 1956, 
polarization of ethnic identities was common. This polarization was the most severe in 
the last two decades when the ruling party politicized the Islamic identity and affiliated 
itself with radical Islamist ideologues. In the early-mid 1990s, Sudan provided a 
sanctuary for Bin Laden as his Saudi government banished him.  Subsequently, the U.S. 
claimed that the country was hosting terrorists and establishing Islamist terrorist links. 
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This led to Sudan’s 1993 designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.1  Other than the 
Sudanese involvement in the ‘War on Terror’, historically the leaders of the country have 
participated indirectly or directly in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in regional affairs including 
the birth of neighbouring Eritrea and in the Cold War.  
Wars and conflict faced Sudan on every front, not only internationally but also 
nationally. Internally, Sudan has been ravaged by two civil wars.  The first is the North-
South civil war, also known as Africa’s longest civil war, and the second is the conflict in 
Darfur.  Khartoum’s involvement in the Darfur conflict resulted in an arrest warrant 
issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the president of Sudan, Omar Al-
Bashir, for crimes against humanity. Omar Al-Bashir’s authoritarian prolonged rule is 
said to eclipse the hopes for a democratic Sudan. Yet, the country underwent four 
democratic governments in the past five decades and therefore the spirit of revival 
persists.  Sudan also experienced a few federal arrangements that are worth examining. 
Additionally, Sudan is one of the first few states to experience secession by a referendum 
in the world. In January 2010, South Sudan exercised its right to self-determination and 
in June 2011, declared itself as Africa’s youngest nation.2  
Research	  objectives	  
The objective of the thesis is to better understand the factors that underlie the 
secession of South Sudan.  Borrowing from the academic literature on secessionist 
movements, this thesis will identify the major factors that played a role in the secession 
of South Sudan. Despite the relevance of colonization and its influence on contemporary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “A	  World	  of	  Information:	  Sudan,”	  UN	  Data,	  accessed	  Oct.	  2010.	  2	  Ibid.	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Sudanese affairs, this dissertation proposes that one should look to post Sudanese 
independence (post 1956) to better understand South Sudan’s secession. The thesis will 
achieve this objective through an examination of two major factors:  the impact of 
Khartoum’s post independence socio-economic and political policies and as well, the role 
of international actors in fanning the flames of secession.  Before presenting an analysis 
of the Sudanese case study, we first present an overview of the insights gained from the 
literature on secession as to the factors that influence demands for secession.   
Analytical	  Framework	  	  
The Latin roots of the term “secede” are ‘se’ meaning ‘apart’ and ‘cedere’ 
meaning ‘to go’. In contemporary political literature, secession refers to “the creation of a 
new state by the withdrawal of a territory and its population, where that territory was 
previously part of an existing state.3”  John R Wood (1981) was the first to build a 
comprehensive theoretical framework for secession as a social and political phenomenon.  
He defines secession as “an instance of political disintegration wherein political actors in 
one or more subsystems withdraw their loyalties, expectations, and political activities 
from a jurisdictional centre and focus them on centre of their own.4”  
As can be seen from Wood’s statement, nationalism is a principal component of 
secessionist frameworks. In fact, some scholars like Sambanis suggest that secession, 
nationalism, decentralization, regionalism, civil war, self-determination, and ethnic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Aleksandar	  Pavkovic	  and	  Peter	  Radan,	  Creating	  New	  States	  (Hampshire:	  Ashgate	  Publishing	  Limited,	  2007),	  5.	  	  4	  John	  R.	  Wood,	  “Secession:	  A	  Comparative	  Analytical	  Framework,”	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Political	  
Science,	  14	  (March	  1981):	  111.	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conflict are entangled phenomena with no clear divide between them.5 The literature on 
these political terms is extensive and provides many different explanations for secession. 
Nevertheless, all existing theories on secession and secessionist movements share the 
underlying assumption that a set of preconditions or factors that lead to the demand of 
secession can or may be identified. However, scholars differ on what these factors or 
conditions are. 
Perhaps the factor most emphasized by scholars is the social one. Wood calls it 
the ‘essential’ element for secession6. The identity of the group is what forms the core of 
this factor. The group must share a collective identity and commonality (common 
ethnicity, culture, and language) and see itself as distinct from the rest in the state. 
According to Wood, secessionist sentiments are ignited when the secessionist group feels 
that its identity is being threatened and is suppressed. These feelings are exacerbated 
when the group experiences discrimination, marginalization and alienation from the state.  
Horowitz is another scholar, who like Wood, focuses on the social factor.7  He 
also suggests that the agents of secession are ethnic groups who share a common culture 
and beliefs. According to Horowitz inequality in ranking and legitimacy between the 
ethnic groups creates ‘group apprehension’ or ‘group anxiety’ among them.8 Here 
Horowitz adds the economic factor to the literature on secession. He holds that those with 
better education and economic standards tend to control the political systems over those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Nicholas	  Sambanis	  and	  Branko	  Milanovic,	  “Explaining	  the	  Demand	  for	  Sovereignty,”	  (2009):	  5.	  https://bc.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/Sambanis_04.07.09.pdf	  	  (accessed	  Apr.	  2011)	  6	  Wood,112.	  (all	  references	  to	  Wood	  are	  taken	  from	  this	  source)	  	  7	  Donald	  Horowitz,	  Ethnic	  Groups	  in	  Conflict,	  (Los	  Angeles,	  University	  of	  California	  Pres,	  Ltd	  1985),	  179.	  	  8	  Ibid.	  (all	  references	  to	  Horowitz	  are	  taken	  from	  this	  source)	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communities that are less educated.   The disadvantaged groups, he proposes will often 
demand secession.  
He states that ‘the path to secession’ is led by “backward groups living in a 
backward region, advanced groups living in a backward region, advanced groups living 
in an advanced region, and backward groups living in an advanced region.”9 Advanced 
groups are those who retain the highest number of post secondary graduates, 
bureaucratic, commercial and professional employment. The ‘backward groups’ are those 
who lack education and are viewed as ‘indolent, ignorant, and not disposed to 
achievement.’10 Advanced regions refer to the states that have a higher than the mean per 
capita income in the state. Horowitz then suggests that backward groups in advanced 
regions will want to secede earlier than advanced groups in the state and that backward 
groups in backward regions will also want to secede more frequently than any other 
group.11 Horowitz’s theory is relevant to developing countries. This is particularly true in 
Africa where ethnicity plays a central role in the political and societal arenas. His theory 
is also pertinent to the African scenario because colonization played a central role in the 
creation of group dichotomies.  
 Colonization left certain groups in power. By doing this, the colonial powers set 
the stage for socio-economic inequalities. Often the group that inherited the political 
apparatus used it to disperse its language and culture and to withhold economic benefits 
selectively. Other than creating patterns of inequality, political underrepresentation 
eliminates the political legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the secessionist group. Wood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  	  Ibid.	  	  10	  Ibid,	  233.	  11	  Pavkovic	  and	  	  Radan,	  183.	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describes this as the political precondition or factor of secession. This does not mean that 
secessionist demands are not present in democratic countries, but it implies that less-
democratic countries may have stronger ones.12  
Daniel Elazar and Arend Lijphart are two scholars who emphasize the inextricable 
link between democracy, decentralization and social harmony, particularly in plural 
societies.13  They hold that centralization and authoritarianism will induce separatism in 
plural societies. Similarly, decentralization and democracy will anesthetize separatism.  
According to Elazar, democracy must be viewed as an alternative to authoritarianism 
because strongman rule is by disposition “inimical to federalism (decentralization).”14  
More often than not, a strongman is not interested in power sharing and since 
decentralization is based on the distribution of power it necessarily conflicts with one-
man rule.15   
For some scholars the social, economic, and political preconditions are 
interwoven, and therefore they use all of the three factors to explain secession. They 
suggest that the three factors essentially fall under the category of the centre’s domestic 
policies. Anthony Smith is one of the scholars who amalgamated these factors in his 
studies.16 His study on separatism and secession focuses on attempts at secession induced 
by nationalist sentiments in Europe and North America.  Among the preconditions, Smith 
suggests are discrimination and ethnic revival which fall under the category of social 
factors, and lack of job opportunity and central government’s neglect or mismanagement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Ibid,	  109.	  	  	  13	  Daniel	  J.	  Elazar,	  Exploring	  Federalism,	  (Tuscaloosa:	  The	  University	  of	  Alabama	  Press,	  1987):	  143	  14	  Ibid,	  80.	  	  15	  Ibid.	  	  16	  Pavkovic	  and	  	  Radan,	  187.	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of ethnic communities which are pertinent to the economic precondition. Among the case 
studies Smith examined in the western world are those of the Flemish and the Québécois. 
 The Flemish separatist movement in Belgium is one of the separatists groups in 
Europe. It rose as a result of the dissatisfaction with the economic and political 
dominance of the French-speaking population. In North America, the Québécois 
population witnessed an unprecedented ethnic revival in the 1960s that gave birth to a 
separatist movement in Canada. Although Smith’s model is based on western 
experiences, it is applicable to many African and Asian states where secessionist 
movements ascend due to discrimination and underdevelopment.17  
If the discrimination is prolonged it could create deep-rooted historical 
grievances. Often the longer the grievances take to get addressed the louder and more 
unbending the demand for secession is. Pavkovic and Radan are two scholars who 
consider historical injustices, defined in terms of cultural, economic and political 
grievances, to be the most reliable indicators to secessionist groups.18  They hold that 
when these grievances consolidate, the secessionist groups will start to actualize 
secession.   
Pavkovic, Radan, and Wood did not mention the role of foreign actors in 
achieving secession. However, the presence of foreign support can be a primary 
determinant of the secessionist movement’s ability to gain de facto secession. Although 
Horowitz mentions the importance of foreign actors, it is scholars like Young, 1994, and 
Heraclides, 1991, who stress this in their frameworks. They propose that the international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Pavkovic	  and	  Radan,	  182.	  	  18	  	  Ibid,	  195.	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community has a decisive role.   They also suggest that foreign involvement can take 
many shapes. Support could take the form of ideological encouragement, non-military 
financial assistance, access to information, funds for military supplies, cross border 
sanctuaries, military training in exile, military equipment, advisors, peacekeeping 
personnel, blockades/interdiction, cross border raids and more.19 Young and Hercalides’ 
studies are of great pertinence especially in our globalized world.  This is the reason 
countries such as Eritrea and East Timor were able to achieve secession while others like 
Chechnya, Kurdistan, and Somaliland still struggle for recognition.  
Sudan,	  its	  Secessionist	  South	  and	  Secessionist	  Theories	  	  	  
These are some of the leading interpretations of secession and secessionist 
movements.  This thesis borrows from them to better understand the secession of South 
Sudan. As in Wood’s theory, South Sudan’s secession is a result of an amalgamation of a 
series of dynamic ‘conditions.’  However, these conditions are not unchanging 
particularly as the war between Khartoum and the South extended for more than four 
decades. For example, while the first civil war could be understood in terms of 
Horowitz’s propositions, a backward group in a backward region, the oil discovery in the 
1970s in the south changed the dynamics of the situation to perhaps a backward group in 
an advanced region.   
Scholars such as Heather Sharky and El-Fatih Salam emphasized the role of social 
determinants.20 Southern Sudanese, although they form different tribes with different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Louis	  Bélanger,	  Érick	  Duchesne,	  and	  Jonathan	  Paquin,	  "Foreign	  Interventions	  and	  Secessionist	  Movements:	  The	  Democratic	  Factor,"	  Canadian	  Journal	  Of	  Political	  Science	  (June	  2005):	  443.	  	  	  20	  Sharkey,	  “Arab	  Identity	  and	  Ideology	  in	  Sudan:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Language,	  Ethnicity	  and	  Race,”	  
African	  Affairs	  (2008):	  4.	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tongues, see themselves as distinct groups of people who differ from the racially mixed 
Northerners. Colonization left only a fraction of the Sudanese society educated and in 
power, a small Northern Arab minority. As the power fell in their hands, they started to 
build Sudan on the tenets of Arab tradition. This assimilationist agenda suppressed 
cultural freedom and incited secessionist sentiments.  
David Rodin is another expert on Sudan. Unlike Sharky and Salam, he focused on 
the economic regional inequity in Sudan and his statistics will be utilized in this thesis.21 
Khartoum, already with limited resources at the time of independence, concentrated all of 
its social and economic projects in the Northern region creating regional inequity, 
marginalization, and underdevelopment.  Therefore, it was not a surprise that regional 
groups, such as the South since the 1950s, the West (Darfur) and East since the 1980s and 
1990s, have ascended demanding autonomous models of governance with equal wealth 
and power sharing.  
Scholars like Emeric Rogier stressed the role of international pressure and 
intrusiveness in the development of Sudan’s internal affairs.22 It is difficult for a country 
that is bordered by nine countries to shield itself from foreign meddling. Sudan’s 
location, as the frontier of Islam and the Arab world in Africa, and its valuable resources 
internationalized the matter further. Each of its neighbours has an agenda concerning 
Sudan’s progress and has contributed to the civil war directly or indirectly.  Some 
supported Khartoum, some backed the South and ironically some supported both.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  David	  Rodin,	  “Regional	  inequality	  and	  Rebellion	  in	  the	  Sudan,”	  JSTOR	  (1974):	  496.	  	  22	  Emeric	  Rogier,	  “No	  More	  Hills	  Ahead?	  The	  Sudan’s	  Tortuous	  Ascent	  to	  Heights	  of	  Peace,”	  The	  
Hague,	  Clingendael	  (2005):	  5.	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The support that has been given to Khartoum or the South has always been the 
factor that tipped the scale favouring one side over the other.  Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD)(an East African organization), and the Friends of 
IGAD, a few western powers including the United States, will ultimately tip the scale to 
the South. The above groups assisted the South in negotiating one of the most 
decentralized forms of government, giving it de facto independence before the 
referendum.  
Methodology	  
 The primary research methods are document analysis and interviews. There is a 
heavy reliance on qualitative data drawn from primary sources such as government 
documents, media interviews and journal articles.  The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
and The Addis Ababa Agreement are the most salient governmental documents used in 
this research.  Interviews are also a primary source of information. In the months of July 
and August 2011, I took an expedition to Sudan to further investigate my research 
question. I was fortunate to interview key informants from the government’s leading 
party, National Congress Party (NCP), and the opposition, Sudan’s People Liberation 
Movement-North (SPLM-N). I also carried out interviews with members of the general 
public including students.  Secondary sources consist of reviews and books. Experts such 
as Wood, Smith, Elazar, Anderson, and Stevenson provided the core of secondary 
sources on secession and the principles of decentralization, while the expertise of scholars 
like Amir Idris, Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Heather Sharkey and Emeric Rogier are 
employed to dissect Sudan’s post-independence troubles.  
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Structure	  of	  the	  Thesis	  	  
Chapter one will proffer an overview of Sudan’s geography, economy, and ethnic 
composition. This is important for the contextualization of the study.  We will see 
through out the course of the thesis that the South’s conflict and secession are largely 
linked to Sudan’s location, and multiethnic and multi-religious characters.  The chapter 
then will turn to the colonial rulers who, through heightening the ethnic and religious 
divisions, planted the seeds of conflict in the pre-independence era.  
Chapter two will give the chronological order of the first and second Sudanese 
civil wars. Through this, the chapter will reveal how the various Sudanese governments’ 
domestic social, economic, and political policies influenced the civil wars and the 
demand for secession. The chapter will also address in detail the Addis Ababa and the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreements as they changed Khartoum’s national policies 
drastically. Finally, the account of the civil wars provided in the chapter will illustrate 
how international and regional politics influenced Khartoum’s domestic policies.    
Subsequently, chapter three will proffer an in-depth analysis of the factors that led 
to secession. The chapter will draw on the thesis’ analytical framework to identify and 
analyze the factors. These factors are the impact of the Northern Arabs’ policies, the 
weakness of Sudan’s democratic governments, the failure of the peace processes, the 
existence of historical grievances, and the role of international actors.  
The conclusion offers a summary of the research’s findings. It also points to the 
probability of future conflicts in both the South and the North due to regional inequality 
and one party dominance in each of the regions. Finally, it is also a recommendation to 
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Juba and Khartoum to draw lessons from past federal Sudanese models and to strive for a 
successful inclusive federal model. One that is characterized by balanced federal 
structure, a sound federal culture, and just federal politics. 
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Chapter	  One:	  Sudan	  -­‐	  A	  Background	  Overview	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 The government of Sudan has been in continuous conflict with its Southern 
region for more than four decades. Prior to the independence of the country, in 1956, the 
South shared nothing with the North except for memories of slavery raids. The mutiny of 
the South thus began prior to the country’s independence when the region refused to be 
governed by a small Arab elite stationed in Khartoum. The South engaged in two civil 
wars with the government. Both of the civil wars, the first (1955-1972) and the second 
(1983-2005), had a devastating impact on the people of the South.23  The first war 
claimed the lives of half million people; and the second resulted in two million lives lost 
and displaced another four and half million, most of whom were Southerners.24 This 
conflict would finally end in 2005 with signing of The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
which also resulted in the secession of the South.   
In order to understand Sudan’s secessionist South and to place the movement for 
secession in context, it is important to have an understanding of Sudanese history. This 
chapter will provide an overview of Sudan in the pre-secession period.  First, the chapter 
will proffer an overview of Sudan’s geography and its central location in the African 
continent. This is important because it is Sudan’s location that defines its multi-ethnic 
and multi-religious character. Sudan’s conflict, as will be seen, is largely understood in 
the context of identity. Second, the chapter will address Sudan’s modest economy, an 
important aspect to the conflict in Sudan. Additionally, the demographics of Sudan and 
the country’s ethnic composition will be discussed in the chapter. The demographics will 
illustrate the extent of regional alienation. Although, the majority of the Sudanese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Luka	  Biong	  Deng,	  “The	  Challenge	  of	  Central,	  Ethnic,	  and	  Religious	  Diversity	  in	  Peace	  Building	  and	  Constitution	  Making	  in	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Sudan,”	  Civil	  Wars	  (2005):	  262.	  	  24	  	  Ibid.	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population has resided in the Southern and Western regions, the power was concentrated 
in the hands of the few northerners. Lastly, the chapter will discuss the history of 
colonization and independence. Through this, the chapter aims to illustrate the impact of 
colonial legacy on Sudan’s internal instability. 
 It is important to note that the following overview of Sudan is limited to the 
period before South Sudan’s secession in July 2011. More specifically the description of 
Sudan is confined to the period between the country’s independence in January 1956 and 
the South’s secession in July 2011. Therefore, any mention that is made of South or 
North Sudan is made within the context of pre-secession Sudan.  
Geography	  
Sudan, located in northeast Africa, was the largest country in Africa and the Arab 
world. It was also the tenth largest in the world with an area of 967,495 square miles 
(2,505,813 square km).25 The former British colony gained its independence in 1956 with 
Khartoum as the capital. Nine African states bordered the country as can be seen from the 
map above, and these were: Egypt to the north; Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east; Kenya 
and Uganda to the southeast; the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African 
Republic to the southwest; and Chad and Libya to the west and northwest respectively. 
 As can be seen Sudan falls in the Arab-African belt. Egypt and Libya are two 
states that identify themselves as Arab first and African second, while the rest of the 
countries strictly define themselves as African. Also while in Egypt and Libya Islam is 
the dominant religion in the rest of the African states animism and Christianity are more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  “A	  World	  of	  Information:	  Sudan,”	  UN	  Data,	  accessed	  Oct.	  2010.	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prominent.26   The Arab-Islamic North Africa has had significant influence on the 
Sudanese population. In fact, Sudan and Egypt were under one governing structure 
between 1899 and 1956. The Sudanese population is thus divided between the Afro-Arab 
belt and all of Sudan’s conflicts can be understood in context of identity along this belt.  
In addition to being divided culturally, Sudan was also divided climatically. 
Sudan had two climatic regions: tropical in the South, and arid desert in the north with the 
exception of well-irrigated areas around The Nile River. The fertile land around The Nile 
River made agriculture feasible. Agricultural production has been the backbone of the 
economy. For example in 2010, the sector employed 80 percent of the 11.92 million 
workers in the country and generated 31 percent of the GDP.27  
Sudan has been known for its diverse agricultural products.  Sesame along with 
cotton often constituted the main export products. The country has also produced large 
quantities of sorghum and wheat, both of which were mainly cultivated for domestic 
consumption. Additionally, Sudan has been known for its groundnuts, millet, Arabic 
gum, sugarcane, mangos, papayas and bananas. However, due to problems with 
transportation and irrigation, the country has not reached its full potential in the 
agricultural sector.28  In addition to the agricultural exports, Sudan has exported livestock 
to surrounding countries in the Middle East and Africa.29  
In 2010, Industries employed 7 percent of the labour force and composed 34.7 
percent of the national GDP, while services employed 13 percent of the labour force and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  Chad	  whose	  more	  than	  half	  of	  its	  population	  adheres	  to	  the	  Islamic	  faith.	  However,	  African	  Islam	  and	  Arab	  Islam	  differ	  on	  many	  fronts.	  	  27	  “Country	  at	  a	  Glance:	  Sudan,”	  Focus:	  Africa,	  accessed	  Oct.	  2010,	  http://focusafrica.gov.in/Country_at_glance_Sudan.html#2	  	  28	  Ibid.	  	  	  29	  Ibid.	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made up 34.3 percent of the GDP.30 In 2010, the infant industries included oil, cotton 
ginning, textiles, cement, edible oils, sugar, soap distillation, shoes, petroleum 
refinement, pharmaceuticals, armaments and automobile-light truck assembly. Because 
Sudan’s industrial sector is one of its weakest, the country imports most of its 
manufactured goods, refinery and transport equipment, medicines and chemicals, and 
textiles. In 2009, the country imported nearly 20 percent of its total import commodities 
from China, followed by a number of Arab countries and India.31 China has been Sudan’s 
largest trade partner. In 2009, Sudan exported 65.3 percent of its export products to 
China, 10.5 percent to United Arab Emirates, and 5.5 percent to Indonesia.32 Sudan’s 
exports included cotton, sesame, livestock, oil, and petroleum products. 
Sudan was able to embark on the various light industries because of the profitable 
oil exports. The country began exporting crude oil in 1999 and recorded its first trade 
surplus in the same year. Increased oil production did not only allow the state to sustain 
light industries, but also to increase its exports and to become one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world as GDP growth registered more than 10 percent per year in 2006 
and 2007.33   
 However, despite the increasing oil revenue and GDP, many Sudanese have 
continued to live at or below poverty due to the country’s long civil war, the Darfur 
conflict, its extremely poor infrastructure, and its heavy reliance on subsistence 
agriculture. At the turn of the new century, 40 percent of the population lived under the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Ibid.	  	  31	  “A	  World	  of	  Information:	  Sudan,”	  UN	  Data,	  accessed	  Oct.	  2010,	  	  32	  “Utl	  Sudan,”	  Italian	  Development	  Cooperation:	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  	  33	  “CIA-­‐	  The	  World	  Fact	  Book-­‐	  Sudan,”	  CIA	  World	  Fact	  Book	  (2008).	  1-­‐1.	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poverty line and the unemployment rate was high at 18.7 percent. Infant mortality was 
also high at 82.43 per 1000 and life expectancy was only 51.42 years.34 
 The above data illustrates the extent of Sudan’s poverty.  In fact in 2010 the 
United Nations Human Development report ranked Sudan the 16th poorest country in the 
world.35 Poverty is more blatant in the regional areas of Sudan. This is one of the main 
reasons that contributed to the creation of regional dissatisfaction with Khartoum. Many 
of the regional areas had to fend for themselves, creating their own institutions that the 
centre failed to establish. Thus, many of the regional groups were alienated and did not 
see legitimacy in the centre. One way for expressing their frustration was through 
demanding secession.  
Ethnic	  Composition	  	  
Table No. (1) 
Regional population distribution and regional ranking by population size from 1973-1983-1993-2008 
censuses36 
SUDAN 
Region 
1993 
(Rank) population (000), % 
1983 
(Rank) population (000), % 
1973 
(Rank) population (000), % 
Northern Region  (7) 1293    (5.1) (9) 1084  (5.3) (7) 918   (6.5) 
Khartoum (3) 3512    (13.7) (6) 1802   (8.7) (6) 1096  (7.8) 
Central region  
Eastern region 
(1) 5433    (21.2) 
(5) 3067    (12.00) 
(1) 4022   (19.6) 
(5) 2209   (10.7) 
(1) 3623  (25.7) 
(4) 1497  (10.6) 
Kordofan  
Darfur 
Bahr Alghazal 
(4) 3323    (13.0) 
(2) 4638    (18.1) 
(6) 1913    (7.5) 
(3) 3091   (15.3) 
(2) 3112   (15.3) 
(4) 2271   (11.0) 
(2) 2098  (14.9) 
(3) 2077  (4.7) 
(5) 1322  (9.4) 
Upper Nile  
Equatoria 
(8) 1258,    (4.9) 
(9) 1150,    (4.5) 
(7) 1595    (7.7) 
(8) 1408   (6.8) 
(8) 761    (5.4) 
(9) 722    (5.1) 
Source: central bureau of statistics 
Analytical report, 1993 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  “A	  World	  of	  Information:	  Sudan,”	  UN	  Data,	  accessed	  Oct.	  2010,	  http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=SUDAN#Social.	  	  35	  Ibid.	  	  36	  “Regional	  population	  distribution	  and	  regional	  ranking	  by	  population	  size	  from	  1973-­‐1983-­‐1993-­‐2008	  censuses,”	  Central	  bureau	  of	  Statistics:	  Analytical	  Report	  (1993),	  accessed	  Feb.2010,	  http://www.cbs.gov.sd/	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As of 2010, the population of Sudan slightly surpassed the 41 million with a 
population growth rate of 2.143. Approximately, 43 percent of the population resided in 
urban areas such as the capital Khartoum.37 This figure has been steadily swelling due to 
the rising regional conflicts that forced people to abandon their lands and move into the 
cities. The accretion was estimated to be 4.3 percent from 2005 to 2010.38  This could be 
seen through the steady increase of residents in the Khartoum region in table 1.  
 
The Sudanese population has not been evenly distributed among the nine primary 
regions in Sudan shown in the image above. The three regions, Upper Nile, Bahr al 
Ghazal, and Equatoria formed the South. Its population in 1973 stood at 19.9 percent of 
the total Sudanese population; in 1983 it was 25.5; and in 1993 it was 19.9. The Central 
region in the east, the South, and Darfur in the west were the most populated regions in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Ibid.	  	  38	  “Utl	  Sudan,”	  Italian	  Development	  Cooperation:	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  accessed	  February	  2011,	  http://www.sudan.cooperazione.esteri.it/utlsudan/EN/country/intro.html.	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the past decades. In terms of population, Khartoum ranked the 6th in 1973, but followed 
with a rise to the third place in 1993. The rank has not changed since then.39  
 
According to the 2008 statistics as seen in table 2, Darfur in the west was the most 
populous with 19.2 percent of the population, while the Central region in eastern Sudan 
ranked second with 19 percent. However, when the three Southern regions are combined 
they come in the first place with 21.8 percent. The Northern region has often been the 
least populated, and its population has been decreasing steadily. It constituted 6.5 percent 
of the population in 1973 and 4.6 percent of the population in 2008.  
It is clear from the above data that the Northern region and Khartoum combined 
have never constituted more than one fifth of the total Sudanese population.40 However as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  “Sudan	  in	  Figures:	  2005-­‐2009,”	  Ministry	  of	  The	  Cabinet:	  Central	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics,	  accessed	  Dec.	  2010,	  http://www.cbs.gov.sd/	  	  40	  Ibid.	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will be seen in the subsequent chapter, political power was concentrated in the hands of 
the few northerners. This political dominance caused considerable resentment in the 
regional areas, particularly in the South and West. It also led the South, west, and east to 
carry armed conflict against the government demanding either equitable political, socio-
economic share or full-fledged secession. 41 
However, to understand Sudan’s civil conflicts one also needs to take account its 
complex ethnic makeup. Sudan has been an atypically diverse country. According to one 
account, Sudan housed about 19 main nationalities, 56 ethnic groups, and about 597 sub-
ethnic groups who speak more than 115 languages.42  Natural and man-made disasters, 
such as food paucity and civil war, have changed the demographic aggregates. However, 
these changes have not influenced the massive ethno-national diversity.43 
In 2010, the largest ethnic category, nearly 40 percent, comprised those 
considering themselves Arab.44 However, the 40 percent is not a homogenous group. This 
is due to regional and tribal loyalties and affiliations.45 The major non-Arab Muslim 
groups are the Nubians in the far north, the nomadic Beja in the northeast, and the Fur in 
the west. Southern groups are non-Arab and they include the Dinka, Nuer, and other 
smaller Nilotic groups. In 2010, the Dinka composed more than 10 percent of the total 
Sudanese population and 40 percent of the South’s, ranging from 1.5 million to 2.5 
million people.  The Nuer has been the second largest group in the South, although this is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  “Utl	  Sudan,”	  Italian	  Development	  Cooperation:	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  	  42	  Deng,	  261.	  	  43	  Atta	  El-­‐Battahani,	  “Sudan	  Votes:	  The	  2010	  Elections	  and	  Prospects	  for	  Democratic	  Transformation,”	  Heinrich	  Boll	  Stiftung	  (2010)	  18:	  32.	  44	  “Utl	  Sudan,”	  Italian	  Development	  Cooperation:	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  	  45	  Idriss	  Salim	  El	  Hassan,	  “The	  Comprehensive	  Peace	  Agreement	  and	  Cultural	  Diversity	  in	  the	  Sudan,”	  
Sudanese	  Journal	  for	  Human	  Rights	  Culture	  and	  Issues	  of	  Cultural	  Diversity	  (2009),	  5.	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debatable as some argue that the Nuer’s population has been equal to or higher than the 
Dinka’s.46  
For most of Sudan’s post independence period Arabic and English had been 
recognized as the two official languages of the country with Arabic widely used in the 
North and English in the South (however, indigenous languages were used more widely 
in the South than English).  In particular, more than 50 percent of the populations spoke 
the Arabic language, about 18 percent spoke Nilotic languages, and Nilo-Hamitic was 
spoken by about 12 percent of the population.47 Religious diversity has also been a 
feature of the Sudanese society. In 2010, the majority of the population adhered to the 
Islamic faith. Muslims made up 70 percent of the population while indigenous belief 
followers constituted 25 percent and Christians constituted only 5 percent.48   
However, the belief that religion is defined across ethnic lines (as in Arab-
Muslims and non-Arab-non-Muslim) is not true. With about 70 percent Sudanese 
Muslims, Sudan has been home to a large non-Arab Muslim population.  Most of the 
non-Arab Muslims are black Africans living in the western region of the country. Also, 
the belief that South Sudan is a Christian entity is a misconception; the majority of 
Southern Sudanese adhere to indigenous belief and Christian and Muslim Southerners are 
only a minority.49 A state official is documented stating that Christians only made up 18 
percent of the South’s population.50   
A large number of refugees from surrounding countries added to the diversity. 	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There have been more than two million refugees living in Sudan. These refugees have 
come from neighbouring countries like Eritrea, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda and Central 
African Republic. Furthermore, there has been more than half a million Egyptians and 
tens of thousands of other Arabs and Africans who have moved to Sudan seeking better 
economic opportunities, or have been in Sudan since pre-independence.51 
This religious, linguistic, and ethnic diversity in the modern context of state raised 
many questions around the concept of citizenship. How to accommodate this ineffable 
diversity while building a nation-state simultaneously, and how to define the Sudanese 
citizenship and on which bases were some of the questions that the ruling elite 
encountered. The manner in which Khartoum addressed these questions is what in 
essence gave birth to the secessionist voice. As will be seen through the course of the 
thesis, Khartoum preferred to promote one identity, the Arab, rendering the rest invisible.  
History:	  Colonization	  and	  Independence	  	  
To a great extent, Khartoum has failed to develop crosscutting values or build a 
shared sense of identity among the Sudanese people. This failure contributed to the 
alienation of regional groups in Sudan, particularly the Southern Sudanese.  Nevertheless, 
many scholars argue that the Sudanese government was unable to develop a Sudanese 
identity because it was unable to undo decades of separation policies initiated by the 
colonizers. One cannot ignore the enormous impact of colonial rule (1898-1956) on 
impairing Sudan’s national culture.  Ethnic manipulation was a central component of the 
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British agenda as the colonial power sought to control fractious groups. In fact, it was the 
colonial period that gave rise to modern ethnic politicization.52  
Prior to colonization different ethnic groups, including the Arabs and non-Arabs, 
intermingled, intermarried, and integrated. The colonial divide and rule strategy alienated 
some of the ethnic groups from one another by law preventing understanding and 
cooperation.  Cotran wrote in 1955 that the imperial agenda “[...] prevented the Sudanese 
from knowing each other, feeling with each other, working with each other and learning 
from each other.”53  
The constructed barriers were blatant when the colonizers enacted the law of 
sealed or closed regions. Under this law, certain areas were sealed off one another, 
particularly the North from the South. Each region was compelled into using its own 
distinct language with harsh penalties facing those who did not. In describing the 
strictness of some of these policies a state minister said, “if you were from the north you 
needed a visa (from the British authorities) to go to the South during colonial rule.54” 
Through this rigid partition, the colonizers detached Southerners from the Arabic 
language and culture and prevented the flow of a common culture up the Nile River 
valley. 
When the British anticipated the end of colonial rule in 1947, the South was 
reunited with the North forming modern Sudan.55 This unification was the outcome of an 
Anglo-Egyptian agreement. The agreement entailed that the British would maintain their 
control over the Suez Canal and in exchange Egypt would annex all of united Sudan as 	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opposed to only the North. However, the Arab North refused to join Egypt later on. 
Gerard Prunier, a French historian, argued that Sudan was “created in error” as the 
current borders do not justify its obvious cultural and ethnic distinctions.56  Colonial rule 
also favoured some groups over others creating hubris on one side and deep resentments 
on the other.  
The North- South Conflict  
The British negotiated the independence of Sudan with only Northern ‘Arab’ 
national movements. This is because the Northern Arabs were the best organized. As 
early as the 1930’s, they mobilized the national movements and instigated the 
independence discourse.57 The Southerners and other eastern and western Sudanese were 
excluded from the process ‘by choice and necessity’ as they lacked political 
organization.58 Shortly before independence, the British transferred all of their powers, 
including the political and economic, to the Northern Arabs.  
The southerners, alarmed by the Arab-British negotiations, held a conference in 
Juba to voice their concerns about their future status. In the Juba conference in 1947, the 
South publicly rejected unity with Khartoum but found itself with no choice as the British 
had already decided on the matter. The southerners followed by holding another 
conference in 1954 in Juba to state their stipulations about their relations with Khartoum. 
The Southern leaders decided that they should either be given an autonomous status 
under a federal model, or that they should exercise the right to self-determination for 
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complete independence from the North.59 The Southerners were assured that their 
demands would be addressed.   
However, the Southerners were wary of the promises they were given concerning 
their autonomy because the Northerners started to infiltrate the South to replace British 
officials as administrators, teachers, and senior officers in the army and police force. For 
them, the Arabs were another group of colonizers. The core of the southerners’ demands 
was that they would be in charge of their own affairs, but the advent of the Arabs 
threatened their vision of an autonomous South.  
In August 1955 Southern soldiers, who were now under Arab officers, mutinied 
as they feared they would be disarmed and moved to the North.  These soldiers would 
flee to the bushes and to neighbouring Uganda and form the core of the Anyanya, the first 
Southern guerrilla movement, named after a type of Southern poison. The British were 
anxious to withdraw and thus refused to send troops to control the mutiny. On January 1st 
1956, Britain granted Sudan independence.60 Khartoum was left to control the mutiny on 
its own and to address pressing constitutional matters.  
The new constitution was hurriedly drafted leaving urgent issues unresolved. 
Sudan encountered three major constitutional dilemmas at the time of independence.  The 
first dilemma involved the constitutional status of Sudan itself and whether Sudan desired 
to remain connected to Egypt. The second matter was the uncertainty about the 
constitutional status of Southern Sudan. (The leaders did not know how to deal with the 
South since it had its own administrative structures in the colonial period). The third 
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concerned the structuring of state institutions.61 The first challenge eclipsed the gravity of 
the other two and as Atta Al Battahani explained, “the main task (for Khartoum) was to 
decide on the future constitutional status of Sudan, and to prepare the country and its 
people for independence during a three-year transitional period.”62  Two major issues 
were left unresolved in the constitution. First, the religious nature of the state was not 
addressed (secular or Islamic); and second, the constitution did not clarify the distribution 
of power between the different regions and levels of government (federal model).63 The 
infiltration of the Northerners to the South and the rejection of the implementation of a 
decentralized model of governance would give rise to the first Sudanese civil war. 
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Sudan’s various governments laid down the foundation for the South’s secession. 
Through giving the chronological order of the Sudanese civil wars, this chapter will begin 
by illustrating how the different government’s domestic policies (social, political and 
economic) facilitated secession. Each of the consecutive governments proposed a set of 
policies in which the South responded to accordingly. Secondly, also through the 
narrative of the civil wars, this chapter will illustrate how the two prominent peace 
agreements came into play, the Addis Ababa, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
and how they ended.  Thirdly, the chapter will reveal the influence of the dynamic 
international and regional politics on Sudan’s civil wars.   Both civil wars, having lasted 
40 years, occurred simultaneously with the Cold War, the ‘undeclared’ regional war, and 
the recent War on Terror.  
Table No. (3) 
Summary of the Sudanese Regimes 64 
 Build-up 
Period 
Catalyst for 
change 
Issues  Major Actors Tools and 
means 
1953-58 1st 
Democratic 
period 
Relatively long 
from 1948-53 
1953 self-rule 
Agreement 
Independence Britain, Egypt, 
Northern 
parties  
Negotiations 
1958-64 Military 
Regime 
Long period Military coup Islamization and 
Arabization 
Anyanya I War 
1964-69 
Transitional 
period and 2nd 
Democratic 
period 
Short period Student 
demonstrations 
Islamization and 
Arabization  
Anyanya I War 
1969-1985 
Military Regime-
71 and one party 
state-85 
Long period Military Coup North-South 
Addis Ababa 
peace agreement 
Anyanya I and 
Numeri 
government 
Negotiations 
and mediation 
1986-1989 3rd 
Democratic 
Period 
Short period Urban unrest and 
labour union 
strikes 
Economy and 
North-South 
Issue 
Mahdi gov’t & 
SPLM 
Negotiations 
and war 
1989-1999 
Military regime, 
One Party state 
Long period Military coup  Islamization and 
Arabization 
SPLM and 
Bashir gov’t 
War 
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The	  First	  Civil	  War	  
The Sudanese civil wars were a direct result of the discontent with Khartoum’s 
domestic (social, economic, and political) policies.  Between Sudan’s independence in 
1956 and 1958, Khartoum was led by a weak coalition government that among many 
things had failed to contain the South’s rebellion. In 1958, General Abboud led a military 
coup and overthrew this newly born and fragile civilian government.  
The military regime (1958-64) laid down the foundations for a centralized 
economic development plan. The regime also endorsed an independent foreign policy, 
where the government cooperated with both Eastern and Western blocs.65  Abboud did 
not only lead a centralized economic plan, but also a centralized form of governance. As 
he was an authoritarian leader he severely limited political participation, and enforced 
rigid social and economic policies. Arabization and Islamization formed the core of his 
regime’s social policies. His policies were repressive to churches and political 
organizations and resulted in increasing the opposition in the North, as the northern 
secularists and leftists condemned them, and inflamed the Southern war.  
 One of the reasons that led to the intensification of the war was the soaring 
strength of the Anyanya; the movement that started the rebellion in 1955.  The movement 
was receiving support from the Ugandan and Israeli governments.66 While the Ugandan 
government provided the movement with room for operation and training, the Israeli 
government provided military training, equipment and other forms of assistance.  
Additionally, the movement gained popular support and increased its followers. In the 
1960s, students and political leaders joined the rebels in Uganda to form the Sudan 	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African Nationalist Union (SANU), with Anyanya as the militant element. SANU’s core 
objective was the self-determination of the South.67  
In trying to suppress the Anyanya, Abboud wasted significant portions of Sudan’s 
revenues. Therefore, frustrations with the General’s government were growing among 
trade unions, urban classes and political and religious groups.68 Communists and radical 
leftists created the United National Front (UNF). With aid from trade unions and 
students, the UNF led a successful protest that was supported by lower ranks of the army 
and ultimately toppled the military regime on October 24, 1964.69 Other elements of 
society were unsatisfied with the ascendency of communists and radical forces. The 
conservative political faction initiated a new movement where they mobilized rural-based 
religious groups. The movement inundated and defeated the leftists. Elections were held 
in 1964 and the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) won creating a 
democratic coalition government.70 
The new civilian government introduced a new set of political policies and the 
South responded positively to them.  The new democratic government allowed a political 
opening and the Southerners were welcomed to join Sudan’s political process. A new 
Southern political party, the Southern Front, was established in Khartoum. The leader of 
the party (Clement Mboro) was also the Minister of Interior in the democratic 
government. All exiled Southerners were also invited to participate in round table 
discussion on solving the problem in the South.  
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However, the Southerners found themselves divided. The southerners were 
divided into two camps, SANU inside (those in Sudan) and SANU outside (those out of 
Sudan). The Southerners belonging to SANU inside abandoned self-determination and 
thought a federal solution would suffice while those involved with SANU outside insisted 
on secession. This led to serious internal unrest as Anyanya fragmented, SANU’s military 
arm. Soon after, Anyanya’s fractions started to fight each other. Attempts for 
reconciliations followed and in a conference held in 1965 both sides decided to hold a 
referendum as means to let the people of the South decide. However, many of the 
Northern representatives rejected any kind of self-determination since elections were 
around the corner. Election time came with a growing discourse around an Arab-Islamic 
agenda for votes.71 This discourse angered the southerners and the war recommenced.   
The war intensified and internationalized with the joining of Israel, Ethiopia and Uganda 
to support Anyanya. Simultaneously, the Arab countries supported Khartoum.  
Generally, the second democratic government’s new social and political policies 
were seen to be disingenuous and ineffective. Although the government’s leaders 
promised political opening they were not willing to negotiate any forms of power sharing 
with the South. Socially, they were inclined to the Arabization and Islamization policies 
and even contemplated implementing the Islamic constitutional law. Discontent with the 
government was on the rise for wasting public resources and continuing to refuse all 
proposals to solve the Southern problem.  Claims of corruption and resource abuse 
exacerbated the public’s frustrations. As a result, leftist elements in the armed forces led 
by Jaafar Numeri took over the government in a bloodless coup in 1969.72   	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Jaafar Numeri’s communist and socialist ideologies required of him to introduce 
an entirely different domestic agenda. His social policies excluded previous Islamization 
and Arabization because as a communist he was opposed Islamic rule. Although he led a 
dictatorial regime, Numeri frequently spoke of an autonomous South. Therefore, his 
dialogue with the Anynaya was promising.  
His socialist rhetoric allowed him to muster Soviet support. However, some 
communists were not satisfied with Numeri’s socialist policies because they claimed the 
policies were diluted. They tried to oust him in an unsuccessful coup and Numeri 
responded by carrying a complete purge of communists. Numeri’s measures towards the 
communists in Sudan distanced him from the Soviet Union, costing him a principal 
source of support. He found himself destitute of all support from the right and left and 
was forced to look for allies elsewhere. He turned to the South hoping that peace with the 
South would increase his legitimacy.73  
Additionally, various international factors brought both Anyanya and Numeri to 
the negotiating table. Numeri began to soothe regional tensions by attempting to improve 
relations with neighbouring countries. In 1971, he signed an agreement with Ethiopia and   
Uganda that entailed the discontinuation of rebel support in the region. Uganda responded 
by expelling the Israelis and this had a devastating impact on Anyanya as it could not 
sustain itself. The movement was then forced to the negotiation table.74  
Therefore it was both of Numeri’s national policies and the international (regional 
and Soviet) stance that led to the negotiations. These negotiations led to The Addis Ababa 
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Agreement, which was ratified in March 1972 and later incorporated into the country’s 
constitution in 1973. The Agreement established a new set of political, social, and 
economic policies, and the South responded to this agreement by incorporating Anyanya, 
its militant wing, into the Sudanese national army.  
Politically, the Addis Ababa Agreement allowed for extensive power sharing. It 
guaranteed Southern representation in the national government.75 It also ensured the 
autonomy of South, which consisted of the three provinces of Equatoria, Bahr Al Ghazal 
and Upper Nile. All the provinces had one regional president.76 The National President on 
the approval of an elected Southern Regional Assembly selected the Regional President. 
The Agreement further dictated that a High Executive Council or Cabinet, appointed by 
the Regional President, would be responsible for all governing aspects in the South with 
the exception of defence, foreign affairs, currency, finance, economic and social planning 
and interregional concerns.  Authority over these sectors would belong to the national 
government. 
 The Agreement’s social provisions were equally far-reaching.  The Agreement 
acknowledged Arabic as Sudan's official language and English as the South's principal 
administrative and didactic language.77  In addition to giving the Southern states a 
regional government, the Agreement guaranteed freedom of religion, personal liberty and 
equality of citizens.  
Several Northern Islamist parties felt that the Agreement had compromised 
Sudan’s Islamic nature and claimed that it fostered separatism in the South. These parties 	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did not ratify The Addis Ababa Agreement and some campaigned against it. Soon, 
Numeri found himself threatened by sectarian political parties and Islamists. He led 
(muassala al-wataniya) the national reconciliation with all religious oppositions. 
Furthermore, he granted some of the religious leaders prominent positions in the 
government and appointed some as advisors. The new regime members started to 
influence Numeri’s domestic policies.  
Turabi, a key figure in the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, had a significant 
influence on Numeri. Turabi, an attorney general at the time, proposed a bill that redrew 
the boundaries of the Southern region to strategically place the newly discovered oil 
fields in the North. Key resources in the South, such as oil and minerals, were discovered 
in the late 1970s.  Numeri initially rejected the proposition and reaffirmed the borders 
agreed upon in The Addis Ababa Agreement.78 However, soon after (in 1980), he 
proposed a plan similar to Turabi’s to the Southern Regional Assembly. In 1981, the 
Assembly rejected his proposal and Numeri responded by dissolving the body. In 1983 he 
created a new state in the South called “Unity” and divided the Southern region into three 
smaller ones with much less authority and power over economic matters.79    
The Addis Ababa Agreement stated that no changes were to be made to the 
South’s governing structure except with a Southern referendum. Therefore, Numeri’s 
unilateral action contravened the Agreement and ended its political, social, and economic 
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policies. This outraged the South who decided to go back to war and created another 
rebel group in the same year, the SPLA, Sudan People’s Liberation Army.80  
What heightened the tensions was Numeri’s decision to establish the Shariah 
decree as the official law of the country. Through this Numeri was imitating the earlier 
policies of Islamization and Arabization.  However, many scholars argue that the 
implementation of Shariah law in 1983 was the principal factor that instigated the second 
civil war and this is not accurate. Although the implementation of Shariah law in 1983 
intensified the dispute around identity, it is understood to not be the prime reason for the 
war. This is evident by the beginning of the war in January 1983, nine months before the 
Shariah decree was announced in September 1983.  
The	  Second	  Civil	  War	  	  
There are few differences between the first and second civil wars. Firstly, while 
the first civil war was fought exclusively over autonomy, the discovery of oil in the late 
1970s in the South added a resource factor to the second. In turn, the conflict intensified 
as neither side wanted to lose the resource to the other. Additionally, while the conflict in 
the first war was limited to the north and South, in the second, conflicts multiplied 
beyond as rebel movements were growing in the east, west and north.81 Finally, while the 
southerners in the first civil war fought for the South’s autonomy, in the second the 
South’s leaders claimed an ideological affiliation to free the entire Sudan, and thus their 
name ‘Sudan People’s Liberation Army’.  
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The SPLA presented itself as a socialist movement that did not only intend to 
‘liberate’ the Southerners but also all of Sudan. Dinka officer Dr. John Garang introduced 
the ideological facet to the SPLA.  Garang, once an officer in the National Army, left 
Khartoum to join the rebellion. Considered a visionary, he founded the mission of the 
SPLA and created its political wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).82 
He also presented a detailed account for a new Sudan in his manifesto.  
Garang proposed that the ‘New Sudan’ must first be built on secularism and 
second on African citizenship.83 The ‘New Sudan’ would reflect the diverse populations 
and ensure economic, social and political equality between the citizens. The predominant 
understanding in the movement was that Sudan’s problem is not ‘the South’ but the 
highly unrepresentative centre. Emeric Rogier suggested that, “unity, secularism and 
socialism were seen as inseparable objectives, since secularism would guarantee respect 
for differences and socialism would ensure reduction of inequalities in a common 
framework.84” Thus, the SPLM/A did not follow the same objectives of Anyanya as 
separatism was not on its agenda.85  
In the South Anyanya II, formed by veterans of the first Anyanya, opposed the 
SPLM/A vision. They continued to follow a separatist agenda where nothing less than 
independence would be acceptable. Whereas both movements initially had Dinka and 
Nuer, soon the SPLM/A became Dinka dominated and Anyanya Nuer dominated. This 
division introduced an ethnic dimension to the rivalry that only ended when Ethiopia 
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began supporting Garang’s non-separatist faction.86 Anyanya II would dissolve with most 
of its troops joining the SPLM/A by 1988.  
While the southerners, Anyanya II and SPLM, were coming to an agreement over 
the leadership of Garang in Juba, in Khartoum protestors filled the streets to remove the 
country’s leadership. In 1985, a broad-based popular movement ousted Numeri. General 
elections were held in 1986 from which Umma, the Democratic Unionist Party and the 
National Islamic Front (NIF) formed a coalition government. The second civil war began 
in 1983 but even the overthrow of the Numeri regime and the rise of the new 
democratically elected government could not end it.  
The newly elected Prime Minister, Saddiq Al-Mahdi, and the SPLM/A leader 
John Garang had conflicting views when it came to the social domestic policies. Ethiopia, 
as an important regional player, attempted to broker an agreement between the parties. A 
resolution seemed probable when Mengistu, the Ethiopian president at the time, contrived 
a meeting between Al-Mahdi and Garang in Addis Ababa on July 31, 1986.87 The 
meeting was held but the issue of Islamic law inhibited progress. Garang demanded that 
the government repeal the Islamic decrees of 1983. Although Al-Mahdi said that he 
would abrogate the decrees, he maintained that new Islamic laws would be decreed in 
Muslim-dominated regions where the rights of non-Muslims would be taken into 
consideration.88 Garang refused and contended that any religion-based structure was 
unacceptable since it would allow religious discrimination and inequality. As Ann 
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Mosely Lesch suggested, “A profound philosophical gap was evident”89 between the 
western educated academics.  
Again, as in previous governments, the failure to reach an agreement on social 
national policies led to the militant escalation of the war with benefits mainly for the 
SPLM/A. A state official suggested, “The rebellion was severe and was gaining 
tremendous strength.”90  The incorporation of Anyanya II along with support provided by 
external elements (Ethiopia, Eretria, Uganda and Cuba) enabled the movement to gain 
control over two thirds of the South including Torit, Bor and Nasir (the three provincial 
capitals of the South).91  
Under pressure from the army and the public, Al-Mahdi started to move towards a 
peace settlement. In May 1989, a ceasefire was announced for one month and the state of 
emergency was revoked. The following month, June 1989, Khartoum agreed to hold to 
abeyance the implementation of the Islamic laws and cancel all military pacts with Egypt 
and Libya. The National Islamic Front (NIF) left the government instantly after the peace 
initiatives and on June 30 1989, three days before negotiations were to start in Addis 
Ababa, Omar Al-Bashir led a military coup and installed the NIF in power.92 
Leading	  to	  the	  CPA	  
The new Islamist government led drastic political and social changes and this 
intensified the conflict with the South to an unprecedented level. First, the new 
government declared its commitment to new radical Islamist tenets such as Jihad. 
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Second, it established new jihadist institutions such as training and educational camps. 
The institutions’ task was to provide support to jihadists groups fighting in the South. As 
one state official said: “These jihadist groups would penetrate the South followed and 
backed by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).93” Al-Bashir did not initiate any 
negotiations; he instead led the war to its apex launching the most aggressive attacks on 
the South.  
 After ratifying a ‘constitutional decree’ that dismissed Al-Mahdi government and 
other state bodies, Al-Bashir appointed himself as the Chairman of the Revolutionary 
Command Council for National Salvation (RCCNS), a 15-member body with all 
executive and legislative powers.94 Al-Bashir also issued other decrees that suspended 
political parties and trade unions. He imposed a state of emergency that prohibited 
demonstrations, opposition newspapers, and allowed the regime to imprison journalists 
and political activists. In 1996, Humans Rights Watch stated that, “secret detention 
houses, known as ‘ghost houses’, were established where leaders of trade unions and 
student unions were tortured in order to break any resistance.95”  
Nearly a year after the coup, Al-Bashir declared that an attempt to overthrow his 
government was made and in response the regime executed 31 army and police officers.96 
Many believe that this was a pretext for removing un-cooperative officers.97 Al-Bashir 
stated that the RCCNS would lead the country in the transitional period, and in 1993 he 
dissolved the body and announced a return to civilian rule. Simultaneously, he declared 	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himself the president of the country holding all executive and legislative powers. By this 
point, Sudan had effectively become an Islamist totalitarian state.  
The Islamist nature of the country was promoted by Hassan Al-Turabi, a long-
established Islamist politician, who had significant influence on Al-Bashir. He was the 
mastermind behind many of Al-Bashir’s policies in the early years. In March 1991 Al-
Turabi convinced Al-Bashir to establish the Criminal Act law. The Act introduced 
Shariah in all provinces, except in the South. Al-Turabi also pressured Al-Bashir into 
political opening and elections. In 1996, non-party elections were held and Al-Bashir was 
the only presidential candidate. Al-Bashir won with 75.7 percent of the votes. In 1999, 
political parties were allowed back into the political arena. It was then that Al-Bashir and 
Dr. Turabi created the National Congress Party (NCP).98  
 Al-Turabi was also behind the new policies towards the South. Apropos the 
South, Al-Bashir and Al-Turabi declared that it was a religious duty to fight and protect 
the Islamic nature of the country. The new jihadists and the army inflicted significant 
losses on the SPLA. This weakened the rebellion.  Al-Bashir also manipulated and 
exploited the South-South conflict.  
During the early 1990’s, the South was witnessing its worst episodes of its own 
civil war as the SPLA/M fractured over power disputes.  In 1996, the Sudanese 
government ratified a peace agreement with rebel ethnic-based factions that had dissolved 
away from the SPLA/M. John Garang, the leader of the SPLA/M, rejected the agreement. 
Undaunted, President Al-Bashir ensconced one of the leaders of the ethnic-based factions 
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as the head of an interim government in the South.99 At this point, the strength of both 
Khartoum and SPLA was equivalent. 
However, by the late 1990s, the SPLM/A was gaining more strength particularly 
as it was receiving support and cooperating with other regional rebel movements.  In the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, the civil war, once confined to the South, stretched to the 
northeast near the Eritrean border. Various regional rebels, such as the Eastern Front and 
the Justice and Equality Movement, cooperated to place pressure on Khartoum. The 
government forces found themselves facing the SPLA/M along with six other opposition 
armies all united under a single commander.100 As a result of the organized rebellion, 
neighbouring countries feared the development of grave instability in the region and 
pushed for conflict resolution measures.101 As Jeffery Haynes described “the threat of a 
wider conflict, amounting to a struggle for the whole of Sudan's identity—either strictly 
Arab-Islamic, or secular and multiethnic—prompted peace initiatives from Libya and 
Egypt, and from Africa's Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD).”102  
Regional peace efforts were accompanied by international ones led by the U.S. In 
November 2002, an American peace envoy, John Danforth, visited Sudan for the first 
time to resolve the conflict between the Sudanese government and the rebels. He 
introduced confidence-building measures and mediated a ceasefire. Later on he stated 
that years of reciprocal mistrust made reconciliation difficult.103   
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Despite the ceasefire the SPLA/M declared responsibility for killing government 
soldiers in an oil-rich area claiming that the Khartoum government had initially 
unleashed a massive assault against some of their bases in defiance of the ceasefire. As 
usual, the parties swerved back and forth between peace and war. Finally, in January 
2004, after 15 months of extensive negotiations, Sudan's government and SPLA/M 
ratified an agreement to share the mounting prosperity of oil exports. Jeffery Haynes 
stated, “this looked as though it might mark the end to one of Africa's longest civil wars 
of modern times,”104 and it did.  The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a compilation of 
a series of peace agreements, was signed in 2005 to conclude the peace between the 
North and South. Four main events lead to the CPA: six years of intense fighting (1992-
1997), important oil discoveries and developments (1997-1999), military stalemate 
interrupted by frequent skirmishes (1998-2000s), and a series of negotiations that laid the 
groundwork for the CPA in 2005.105  
Two parties - the SPLA/M and the Government of Sudan – were the principal 
actors in negotiating and ratifying the CPA. At the time of the negotiations, the National 
Congress Party (NCP), led by Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, essentially dominated the 
government of Sudan. According to the 2000 National Assembly Elections, the NCP 
acquired 355 out of 360 seats (98 percent), leaving 5 seats for independents as seen in 
table 5. Table 4 shows that Omar Hassan Al-Bashir won the presidential elections with 
86.5 percent of the votes.106 The 2000 election failed to meet the international standards 
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of transparency and fairness.107 In fact, the elections were boycotted by most of the major 
opposition parties. Therefore, the ‘NCP’ and the ‘Government of Sudan’ denoted the 
same entities, and as such the terms could be used interchangeably. 
Table No. (4) 
13-23 December 2000 Presidential Election*/** 
Registered Voters 12,000,000 (approx.) 
Total Votes (Voter Turnout) Not Available 
Candidate Party        % Of Votes 
Omar Hassan Al-Bashir (NCP) 86.5% 
Jaafar Numeri (APWF) 9.6% 
Malik Hussain 1.6% 
Al-Samuel Hussein Osman Mansour (LD) 1.3% 
Mahmoud Ahmed Juna 1.0% 
*The election was boycotted by most of the major opposition parties. 
**Voting did not take place in three Southern states that were under rebel control. 
 
Table No. (5) 
13-23 December 2000 National Assembly Election*/** 
Registered Voters 12,000,000 (approx.) 
Total Votes (Voter Turnout) Not Available 
Party Number of Seats (360) 
National Congress Party (NCP) 355 
Independents 5 
*The election was boycotted by most of the major opposition parties. 
**Voting did not take place in three Southern states that were under rebel control.  
The	  Comprehensive	  Peace	  Agreement	  	  
The CPA enacted an entirely different set of political, social and economic 
policies. Although the Addis Ababa Agreement had similar provisions, three main 
differences between The Addis Ababa and The Comprehensive Peace Agreements exist. 
All the differences are related to the amount of autonomy granted to the South by the 
CPA, which was unprecedented. A state minister suggested, “While the public thought 
that The Addis Ababa Agreement was quasi-independence the CPA was thought to be the 	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actual independence of the South.”108 To begin, The Addis Ababa Agreement did not 
recognize any of the South’s rights in their resources, while the CPA included a wealth 
sharing agreement that guaranteed the South 50 percent of the resources, namely oil. 
Second, The Addis Ababa included minimal Southern representation in Khartoum, while 
the CPA gave the South proportionate representation. And finally, the CPA allowed the 
South to maintain its armed forces while The Addis Ababa Agreement forced the South 
to dissolve its army.  As SPLM-North member suggested in an interview, the Southern 
representatives had learned from their previous mistakes and were more aware of their 
rights.109 
 The CPA comprises six individual agreements which are in order: (1) July 2002, 
The Machakos Accord; (2) May 2004, Power-Sharing Agreement; (3) January 2004, 
Wealth-Sharing Protocols; (4) May 2004, The Resolution of the Abyei conflict; (5) May 
2004, The Resolution of the Conflict in the Two States of Southern Kordofan and Blue 
Nile; and, finally, (6) September 2003, the Security Arrangements Agreement.110  The 
first chapter of the CPA agreement established a six-year interim period, commencing 
July 9th 2005, where Southern Sudanese would govern their own regional affairs and 
participate equally in the national government. The South's administration adopted the 
title 'Government of Southern Sudan' (GoSS) rather than being designated as a regional 
body merely. The GoSS would have full autonomy including its own government, 
constitution, army, flag and budget.111  The Agreement also stated that by the end of the 
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interim period, on January 9th 2011, the people of the South would vote on a referendum 
either to consolidate Sudan’s unity or to secede. Shortly after ratifying the CPA, an 
Interim National Constitution (INC) was written. The INC included all CPA provisions 
and was held in enactment until July 9th 2011. Throughout the interim period, the CPA 
stressed that the national government is to exert all efforts to make a unified Sudan an 
attractive option to Southerners.112  
Cultural	  Understanding	  
The cultural aspect of the Agreement was stressed in the first chapter of the CPA, 
the Machakos Protocol. The government of Sudan recognized that Sudan is a multi-
cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual country.113 The 
government of Sudan also agreed “the conflict in Sudan is the longest running conflict in 
Africa. It has caused horrendous loss of life, destroyed the infrastructure of the country, 
wasted economic resources, and caused untold suffering, particularly with regard to the 
people of South Sudan.”114 The CPA and INC ensured the legal pluralism of the country. 
One provision that was enacted permitted each state in Sudan to introduce new legislation 
commensurate with the religion and customs of the majority of its people, and to revoke 
any national legislation that opposed them.115 
One section of the CPA titled ‘State and Religion’ established freedom of faith 
and forbade discrimination on the basis of religion.116 While Islamic Shariah was 
recognized as the only source of legislation in Northern Sudan, the CPA and INC 	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protected the religious rights of non-Muslims in the area. In Sudan, one cannot address 
religion or language separately as the two are inexorably connected. Therefore, the CPA 
and INC viewed all indigenous languages of Sudan as national languages to be esteemed, 
fostered and promoted.117 Although English and Arabic were recognized as the official 
languages for work and instruction in schools, the CPA and INC gave the right for any 
state in Sudan to adopt its majority language for these purposes.118 Another important 
aspect of the cultural entente was citizenship. Citizenship is critical to peacemaking, 
particularly in light of a history of Islamization and Arabization, where it was primarily 
based on one religion and culture. Sudan’s INC recognized citizenship as the basis of all 
rights and obligations for all Sudanese including equality before the law.119  
Power	  Sharing	  	  
The power sharing protocol was concluded in 2004 and it is perhaps the most 
salient component of the CPA. The CPA outlined that all parties involved are “convinced 
that decentralization and empowerment of all levels of government are cardinal principles 
of effective and fair administration of the country.”120 The signatories expressed their 
commitment to the underlying principles of power distribution and acknowledged the 
sovereignty of the nation as vested in its people as well as the Government of Southern 
Sudan and States throughout the country. There were three-tiers of power-sharing, one 
distinct to the national level manifested in the Government of National Unity (GNU), one 
to the Government of Southern Sudan, and another for the 25 States in Northern and 
Southern Sudan. The power sharing protocol established the institutions of the GNU. It 	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included the legislature, executive, judiciary and other institutions and commissions 
specified in the Agreement and the Interim National Constitution.121  The Agreement 
stated that the NCP would hold 52 percent while the SPLM would hold 28 percent and 
the remaining parties would hold 20 percent of the judiciary, executive, and legislative 
institutions in the GNU. Thus, the CPA guaranteed representation to the South in all of 
the governmental institutions.122 
Wealth	  Sharing	  	  
The wealth-sharing protocol was another important aspect of the CPA, 
particularly when it came to oil. Although, 80 percent of Sudan’s oil is generated from 
the South123, all the pipelines responsible for its transport to the Red Sea pass through the 
North from Khartoum to Bour Sudan on the Red Sea.  According to the protocol, two 
percent of oil revenue was to be turned to the oil-producing state in the South.124 The 
remaining net revenues would be shared on 50 percent basis between the GoSS and the 
GNU.125 The wealth sharing protocol also gave the GNU the ability to collect revenues 
from personal income, corporate income and custom taxes nationwide. Additionally, the 
GoSS has the ability to collect personal income taxes, luxury taxes and business taxes in 
the South. Dual banking systems would be established according to the protocol with two 
separate currencies until the Central Bank could design a new currency that would reflect 
the cultural diversity of Sudan.126  
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The	  Secession	  	  
An assessment of the implementation of the CPA, including wealth and power 
sharing, will be discussed in the following chapter. However, its implementation was 
poor on many fronts and as a result of this and other factors stated in the subsequent 
chapter, the southerners were inclined to secession.  In mid 2010, Salva Kiir said, “It will 
need a miracle to change the Southerner’s opinion about separation.”127 On February 14th 
2011, the first official referendum results were declared. The South, as anticipated, 
overwhelmingly (about 97 percent) voted for separation. On July 9th, the South celebrated 
its official independence from Sudan forming The Republic of South Sudan, Africa’s 
newest state.   
Conclusion 
Khartoum’s policies are the first and foremost determinant of the civil war and the 
call for secession.  When an opposition member was asked about the determinants of 
secession he responded, “the call of separation in the South was always [dependent] on 
the kind of government in the North. Sometimes the parameter went up and sometimes it 
went down subject to the type of government in Khartoum.128” The brief narrative of the 
civil wars illustrated that when Khartoum recognized the South’s political rights that 
include self-rule and fair representation in the government, economic rights that entail 
equitable share of resources, and social rights that involve profound respect to the South’s 
culture, tradition, and languages peace was attainable. However, this was not the case 
with Abboud’s military regime.  	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The call for secession was vehement during Abboud’s dictatorial regime, 1958- 
1964. This is because the regime enacted an assimilationist social agenda that suppressed 
the South’s identity and a centralized political structure that dismissed their right to self-
government. The South responded by strengthening Anyanya I and the result was the 
continuation and intensification of the war.  The second democratic government spoke 
the rhetoric of social justice and political opening including democracy and 
decentralization.  The South responded by showing its willingness to participate in 
Sudanese politics through forming political parties and bases in Khartoum. The revival of 
a united Sudan with a federal discourse also grew among the Southerners. As soon as the 
democratic government’s disingenuous intentions became apparent, through rejecting the 
South’s right to self-determination and reconsidering the Islamic-Arab Agenda, the South 
turned to war.  
Jaafar Al Numeri’s respect to the South’s social and political autonomy, which 
was stated in the Addis Ababa Agreement, led to the more than ten-year peace 
agreement. During this period, the call for secession in the South was considerably 
muted. The abrogation of The Addis Ababa Agreement led to the creation of the SPLM/A 
and the second civil war, which was fuelled by the implementation of Shariah in 1983.  
The war reached its peak with the ascendance of the radical Islamists in 1989, 
who increased the polarization of the Sudanese identity. They led a centralized form of 
governance with rigid political and social policies. Peace would only rise again with The 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, that similar to the path of The Addis Ababa 
Agreement, respected the South’s social autonomy and granted them proportionate 
wealth and power sharing.  
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The sensitivity of Khartoum and the South to international factors was also 
discussed in this chapter.  The role of foreign actors cannot be underestimated in the 
unfolding of Sudan’s political development, particularly the civil war. Khartoum joined 
the Arab League in the 1950’s and received support from its Arab neighbours who were 
committed to pan-Arabism. Israel with its conflict with Arab countries over Palestine was 
exploiting opportunities to weaken its rivals. Anyanya was there to receive Israeli support 
in the form of equipment and training.  
On the broader international scene, the Arab countries were receiving support 
from the Soviet Union, who later on with the rise of Numeri’s socialist government 
supported Numeri directly. The support that was given to both Khartoum and the South 
was what kept the war alive. The severing of Israeli support and Soviet support on both 
sides, caused by Numeri’s new regional friendly strategy and his purge of radical 
communists, forced both sides to the negotiating table.   	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This chapter provides an in depth analysis of the factors that led to secession. The 
factors are: the impact of the Northern Arabs’ policies, the weakness of Sudan’s 
democratic experiments, the failure of the peace processes, the existence of entrenched 
historical grievances, and the role of international actors. All of the aforementioned 
factors fall under the conceptual paradigm introduced in the opening of the thesis. These 
factors are social, economic, political, and international.  
1.	  Northern	  Arabs’	  Policies	  
One of the most important factors that contributed to the secession of South Sudan 
is the Northern Arabs’ national policies. Their policies can be categorized under regional 
discrimination and Arabization and they were able to implement them because they had 
exclusive control of the government after independence. The Northern Arabs were the 
most educated and as such were strongly favoured by the colonial powers who transferred 
all economic, social and political powers at independence. Tribes such the Ashraf, 
Shayqiyah, Ja’aliyya, and Rubatab are among these groups.129 El-Fatih Salam states that, 
“to the disfranchised independence meant a change of political leaders with favouritism 
and nepotism dominating the scene.”130  
Empowering the Northern Arabs was a direct result of the Anglo-Egyptian 
inequitable distribution of resources and social and economic investment from 1898 to 
1956.131  The Anglo-Egyptian administration concentrated nearly all social and economic 
activities, investment, and capital resources in the Khartoum province and the Northern 
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province to the neglect of the rest of the country.132 The nucleus of investment was The 
Gezira (between The Blue and White Niles) and the Riverian districts, both of which fall 
in the Khartoum region.133 The inequity was also applied to the allocation of 
communication, transportation and education facilities.  For example, the majority of 
schools were in Northern Sudan, where conditions were more conducive to learning than 
in the remaining nomadic societies. The sedentary Nubian and arabized tribes along the 
Nile had a literary written language that made schooling easier.  By 1944, “483 of the 
colony’s 514 secondary school students were recruited from Blue Nile region, Khartoum, 
and Northern Provinces.”134 By independence (1956), as a consequence of inequity, cities 
like Khartoum, Medani, Atbarah, Port Sudan and Obeid were flourishing economically 
and socially; they were becoming the commercial and industrial centres of the country 
while the peripheral areas of Sudan were marginalized.  
a)	  Regional	  Discrimination	  
In the postcolonial period, one dimension to the Northern Arabs policies was the 
continuation of the discriminatory and exclusionary economic, social, and political 
policies that prompted secessionist demands.   As in the Smith’s framework, regional 
discrimination and negligence can galvanize groups into separatism, both of which were 
part of Khartoum’s economic scheme. 
 After Independence, Sudan instigated the Ten Year Plan of Economic and Social 
Development (1961 to 1971). Under the plan, major public investment was concentrated 
in three agricultural projects in the Northeast. The projects of the Ten Year Plan 
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consumed 75 percent of national agricultural expenditure.135 The World Bank prepared 
the plan with advice from United Nations Advisors. Its structure, Rodin described, 
portrayed a cognizant effort to continue on the path of growth evolved during the colonial 
period believing that “in general more advanced growth in one region will spill over into 
other regions and that the former will partly supply the resources - without arresting its 
own growth - to develop the latter.”136  
The only major government projects financed outside the Riverine core were 
railway links constructed from Khartoum to Nyala in the West and Wau in the South.  
McLaughlin estimated that The Gezira district alone was receiving 77 percent of all 
government spending in the late 1950’s. Two decades after independence, another 
economist indicated that all towns with industrial bases were located in central Sudan and 
The Nile corridor, and that the peripheral regions had virtually none.137 Decades after 
independence, 75 percent of the industrial bases were established around Khartoum.138  
Even in the past few years, and after the discovery of oil, the oil-generated prosperity 
continued to be reflected in only a few Northern states. Infrastructure, economic and 
social development projects remained to be concentrated in the Khartoum region with 
much less investment in the regional areas of the country.  
 Horowitz’s framework suggests that backward groups in backward regions were 
the fastest to demand secession. In Sudan, all of the groups and regions, save the 
north/centre, were disadvantaged socially and economically and this led to wide spread 
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rebellion, particularly in the South.  David Rodin explained, “the west, parts of the east, 
and the South remained social and economic backwaters… regions of low investment 
peripheral to the core and comprising most of the Sudan remained underprivileged in 
almost every respect.”139  
Inequalities were not limited to the economic sphere. Politically, the Northern 
Arabs carried a policy of regional exclusion. As in Wood’s framework, this led to 
diminishing the central government’s legitimacy in the eyes of regional groups and they 
turned to separatism. These same groups, to a great extent, were underrepresented in the 
national government and thus felt secluded and alienated. Since independence, the 
Northern Arabs, who make up a minority in the country, controlled most of the 
government. There was a large degree of alienation of non-Arab and western and eastern 
Arab groups. The northerners made up less than six percent of the entire population; 
nevertheless they continued to form the majority of the government after 
independence.140 Table 6 shows how the ministerial share of the Northern residents 
varied between 60 and 80 percent, with the sole exception of the second democratic 
period, 1986-89, when the share fell to 47 percent.141 This is despite that they constituted 
less than 5 percent of the entire Sudanese population.142 
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Table No. (6) 
 
- Sudanese Government - Regional Representation (%) 
 
Regions States Population  
Share  
(%, 2001) 
Regimes      
   Abboud  
1954-64 
(Military)  
Second 
Democracy 
1964-69 
Numeri 
(Military)  
1969-85 
Transitional Military 
Council  
1985-86 
Third 
Democracy  
(Al-Mahdi)  
1986-89 
Revolutionary 
Command Council 
(Al Bashir)  
June 1989 
Eastern Gedharif        
 Kassala 11.7 1.4 2.05 2.5 0 2.6 0 
 Red Sea        
Northern Northern River Nile 4.7 79 67.9 68.7 70 47.4 66.7 
Central Blue Nile        
 Gezira        
 Khartoum 36.9 2.8 6.2 16.5 10 14.7 0 
 Sinnar        
 White Nile        
Southern Bahr Al-Ghazal        
 Equatorial 16.0 16 17.3 7.8 16.7 12.9 13.3 
 Upper Nile        
Western Darfur        
 Kordofan 30.6 0 6.2 3.5 3.3 22.4 20 
   
b)	  Arabization  
The second dimension to the Northern Arabs’ policies was Arabization. The 
Northern Arabs used the inherited governmental apparatus to advance their Arab tenets 
and tradition through an assimilationist agenda. As in Horowitz and Woods’ theories of 
secession, any assimilationist approach that threatens any group’s identity and suppresses 
its culture is likely to instigate secessionist sentiments. This is the reason experts on 
Sudan such as Sharky and Salam argue that the policy of ta’arib or Arabization was the 
policy chiefly responsible for undermining the state’s stability and fuelling ethnic rivalry 
post-independence. Arabization also accompanied, in some occasions, sentiments of 
racial supremacy. This racial hubris, in particular, increased resistance.143 
Ta’arib, historically, has been tremendously successful in Sudan and met little 
opposition. This is mainly true in its linguistic side. In fact, Arabic continues to spread 	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today at the grassroots level as a lingua franca.144 The phenomenon began with the early 
iftetah al-islamy or Islamic opening of North Africa that was characterized by an 
inundation of Muslim Arab nomads. The process accelerated with the collapse of the 
Nubian Christian Kingdom and the rise of the Funj Islamic sultanate in North central 
Sudan.145   
Knowledge of the Arabic language spread along with the spread of Islam in 
Sudan.  The diffusion of Arabic came as new Muslims wanted to learn the language of 
The Quran, the holy book of Islam, and the ‘technology of literacy’.  The technology of 
literacy allowed for recording business transactions and biographical accounts since most 
of the local cultures were oral. Intermarriages between the Non-Arab members and Arab 
pastoralists also helped to disseminate the Arab culture.146  
In contrast to the successful historical spread of Arabic, the attempt to achieve 
national unity through Arabization as a post-independence policy has been viewed as a 
failure. Ta’arib as a governmental policy entailed the implementation of official 
measures to diffuse Arabic culture and Islam to all regions. One of the aims of the policy 
was to rapidly proliferate Arabic to territories where non-Arab languages were spoken.  
In many instances the top-down policies of ta’rib undermined Sudanese unity and 
instead provoked enmity and resistance. Many of these policies were implemented 
immediately after independence. Two years after independence (1958), the first 
postcolonial Abboud regime (1958-64) decreed Islam and Arabic the official religion and 
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language of Sudan.  Another implication of this policy was changing  ‘the day of rest’ in 
the South from Sunday to Friday (the Islamic sacred day).147  
Yet another example of the Arabization policies was the implementation of 
Shariah as the official law of the nation by president Numeri in 1983. This unilateral 
action contributed to the fervour of the second civil war. This and similar examples 
caused widespread anger and resentment in the South and among the secularist Northern 
opposition. Heather Sharky described “ultimately the strong-arm Arabist ideology of 
successive postcolonial Khartoum regimes had stimulated the formation of an 
oppositional Africanist ideology, this new Africanist ideology called for plurality of 
African cultures and languages rather than the cultural singularity of Arabization.”148 The 
policies of ta’rib and regional discrimination have contributed to Sudan’s two civil wars 
in the Southern region and the more recent conflict in Darfur.149  
The existing ethnic and religious polarization were magnified by the ascendance 
of the Islamists (1989), National Islamic Front (NIF). Prunier suggested the NIF 
“repackaged the old themes of Arab domination into a more attractive radical Islam 
guise.150”  Internally, the NIF came to power with an anti-peace and pro-Islamist agenda. 
It insisted on an assimilationist approach to ruling Sudan in which Arabic would become 
the sole language and Islam would continue to spread southwards.151 The NIF used its 
radical rhetoric to fuel the war against the South describing the war as jihad against the 
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pagans. Their radicalism also led other Northern moderate Islamic parties to oppose them 
(Democratic Unionist and Umma Parties). 
Arabization along with the unequal economic and political institutional structures 
continued to marginalize the peripheral ethnic groups resulting in the development of 
regional discontent and separatism.152 For the regions, the centre was illegitimate because 
it did not politically represent them, invest in their economic or social development, and 
allow them to maintain their identity.  Thus, many of these groups, like those of Southern 
Sudan, resorted to violent mobilization in an effort to gain social, economic and political 
autonomy.  The result was Africa’s longest civil war that many scholars such as El-Fatih 
Salam anticipated.  
El Fatih Salam suggests, “…By intentionally laying the foundations for structural 
inequalities, the colonists were leaving behind a political time bomb.”153  This political 
bomb could have of been off set by the success of a democratic system of governance. A 
sound democratic system would assure equal representation and inclusiveness, which 
would set a path to equal social and economic policies. Most importantly, only a 
democratic system would allow and foster a decentralized and accommodative system of 
governance. All of the South’s demands, such as decentralization, accommodation and 
equal political representation necessitated democratic governance. This leads to another 
factor that contributed to the secession of South Sudan, the states’ democratic failures.  
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2.	  The	  Weakness	  of	  Sudan’s	  Democratic	  Governments	  
Table No. (7) 
 Build-up Period Catalyst for change Issues  Major Actors Tools and 
means 
1953-58 1st 
Democratic 
period 
Relatively long 
from 1948-53 
1953 self-rule 
Agreement 
Independence Britain, Egypt, 
Northern parties  
Negotiations 
1958-64 Military 
Regime 
Long period Military coup Islamization and 
Arabization 
Anyanya I War 
1964-69 
Transitional period 
and 2nd 
Democratic 
period 
Short period Student 
demonstrations 
Islamization and 
Arabization  
Anyanya I War 
1969-1985 Military 
Regime-71 and one 
party state-85 
Long period Military Coup North-South 
Addis Ababa 
peace agreement 
Anyanya I and 
Numeri 
government 
Negotiations 
and mediation 
1986-1989 3rd 
Democratic 
Period 
Short period Urban unrest and 
labour union strikes 
Economy and 
North-South Issue 
Mahdi gov’t & 
SPLM 
Negotiations 
and war 
1989-1999 
Military regime, 
One Party state 
Long period Military coup  Islamization and 
Arabization 
SPLM and 
Bashir gov’t 
War 
2000-2005 
Restricted 
Democratic 
Practice 
Medium period Oil, international 
pressure 
North-South  
Darfur 
SPLM, NCP 
(Khartoum 
Gov’t), IGAD 
N-S -
Negotiations 
Darfur - War 
2005-2011 4th 
Democratic 
Period 
Medium Period Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement 
North-South SPLM, NCP, 
IGAD 
Negotiations 
and Secession  
The second factor of the South’s secession is the weakness of the Sudanese 
democratic governments. The short-lived democracies failed to restructure Sudan on 
impartial regional representation and equitable economic and social grounds. The absence 
of effective democratic governments increases the probability of conflict and separatism 
in plural societies as was stressed in Elazar and Lijpharts’ theories. Unfortunately, post-
independence democratic governments in Khartoum were ineffective and this 
consolidated secessionist sentiments.   
Table 7 shows that Sudan witnessed four democratic periods.154  The leaders of 
the democratic governments misused the country’s resources, failed to find a solution to 
the civil war, and failed to develop the country socially or economically.155 The 
politicians often engaged in corrupt practices and were not responsive to the civilians. 	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State institutions were too ineffective to hold the government accountable or to 
implement the rule of law. According to Hamid, when looking at the events of the late 
third democratic period (1986-89) “any veteran observer is bound to have a déjà vu.”156 
The resemblances between the short-lived second democratic period (1964-69) and the 
third democratic period (1986-89) were indeed remarkable: 
  The political malaise permeating then paralyzing the body politic in the late 1980s is like an 
uncanny recurrence of the same affliction that plagued the country in the late 1960s: the same 
disarray of the same coalition governments of the same political parties; the same instability that is 
symptomatic of an unworkable political system and an unpredictable political process. The 
bankrupt economy, drained by a costly civil war, corruption and mismanagement is even worse 
than the recurrent economic crises of the 1960s. It is as though history is repeating itself with a 
vengeance.157  
 
Sidahmed contended that the political parties were not concerned about justice, 
multiparty democracy and liberty. He asserts that the two revivals of democracy in 1965 
and 1985 were mere accidents caused by the “[...] weakness of military regimes, not the 
strength of democrats.”158  
 The CPA instigated the fourth democratic period. Democratic transition was at the 
heart of the CPA and the signatories recognized that “ … good governance, 
accountability, transparency, democracy, and the rule of law at all levels of government 
(are all necessary principles) to achieve lasting peace (and attractive unity).159” However, 
like its predecessors, the fourth democratic transition rendered a successful democracy 
unlikely when taking into account the history of its leadership, the NCP. A history that 
involved manipulation of ethnic relations, brutal intensifying of the South-North conflict, 
responsibility for the outbreak of the Darfur conflict, continuous reports of humans rights 
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violations, arrests of journalists and the deportation of western diplomats caused serious 
doubts on the legitimacy of the NCP’s democratic credentials and its commitment to 
democracy in Sudan.160  
 In fact, during Al-Bashir’s ruling period, key elements of the democratic structure 
have been weakened. These include a vibrant civil society and strong opposition parties. 
A vibrant civil society is necessary to achieve a genuine democratic system with respect 
for human rights.161 And regardless of the abortive efforts and ineffectiveness of the past 
Sudanese democratic periods, one cannot ignore the civil society’s imperative role in 
bringing about the democratic regimes. The Sudanese trade unions, in particular, were 
known to be among the most vibrant in Africa and the Middle East.162 Trade unions, 
advocacy groups, charitable organizations, and human rights organizations were 
numerous and active. However, when Al-Bashir came to power, non-governmental 
organizations and the media became subject to callous repression. Legislation was 
enacted that restricted and repressed organizations that were perceived to be a prospective 
threat to the regime. As a result, the organizations that survived kept a low profile. These 
organizations avoided human rights advocacy and focused on development work. Civil 
society was emaciated during the 15-year authoritarian rule by the NCP. Unfortunately, 
even with its minimal resurrection in the last few years, it was excluded from the CPA 
negotiation process.  
The NCP’s suppressive attitude dulled and weakened not only the once-vibrant 
Sudanese civil society but also other political parties, incapacitating them from fighting 
for Sudan’s unity. Strong opposition parties are crucial for a genuine democratic 	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transition as they hone a system of checks and balances. Northern opposition parties have 
been excluded from the government for several years, and as such initially eulogized 
seemingly democratic changes since it gave them an opportunity to reconnect with their 
political centres.163 However, very similar to civil society groups, they lacked resources 
and were beleaguered and marginalized. Only two parties could finance their campaigns, 
the NCP and SPLM.  
The opposition and civil society groups also criticized the NCP for strong man 
behaviour that was not conducive to genuine democracy such as the party’s control of 
government institutions.  The institutions created by the CPA were weak and directly fell 
under the heel of the NCP or the SPLM. This resulted in the ineffectiveness of state and 
the absence of accountability. For example, despite the CPA provisions, serious concerns 
existed regarding the use of state resources by the NCP.164  Moreover, there was a serious 
lack of transparency with regard to the NCP’s funding and expenditure. Allegations of 
extensive corruption by state officials incited much controversy. Despite this, a direct 
investigation was not instigated.165  
In fact, no enquiries were launched to assess one of the most contentious CPA 
provisions, the national elections. The national elections were an imperative component 
of the CPA. However, opposition parties, civil society groups and foreign observers 
declared serious electoral irregularities and even obvious NCP rigging of the entire 
electoral process, from registration through to polling.166 These concerns were 
disregarded as unproven by the National Elections Commission.  An SPLM member who 	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was the Chairperson of the High Election Committee at the time of elections suggested in 
an interview with the author, “they (the NCP) manipulated everything, they used food, 
aid, everything to buy votes. And this is one of the biggest violations of the CPA and the 
election law. Many other things, like the freedom of press and speech were not there, 
even during the election times. This did not create a conducive atmosphere for free 
elections.167”  
Omar Al-Bashir won the presidential elections with 68.24 percent of the votes as 
can be seen in table 8. And as table 9 shows, in the National Assembly elections, Al-
Bashir’s NCP gained 323 seats out of 450. Under the CPA parliamentary arrangement, 
the NCP had 52 percent of the seats and as a result of the 2010 elections, the NCP made 
considerable gains with 72 percent of the seats.168  This increase gave the NCP a clear 
majority in parliament. The NCP became more intransigent with the SPLA, which at the 
time only had 22 percent of the seats. The problematic elections sabotaged all democratic 
prospects and undermined the most important peace agreement in Sudan’s history, the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.   
Table No. (8)  
11-15 April 2010 Presidential Election 
Registered voters 16,500,000 
Total Votes (Voter Turnout) N/A 
Invalid/Blank Votes N/A 
Total Valid Votes 10,114,310 
Candidate (Party) Number of Votes % of Votes 
Omar Hassan al-Bashir (NCP) 6,901,694 68.24% 
Yasir Arman (SPLM) 2,193,826 21.69% 
Abdullah Deng Nhial (PCP) 396,139 3.92% 
Hatim Al-Sir (DUP) 195,668 1.93% 
Others _____ 4.22% 
Prior to the election being held, a total of five candidates had withdrawn from the race: Yasir Arman, Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Hatim Al-Sir, 
Mubarak Al-Fadil, and Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud. Their names, however, remained on the ballot and each gained votes. 
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Table No.  (9) 
11-15 April 2010 National Assembly Election 
Registered Voters 16,500,00 (approx) Total Voters N/A 
Party  Number of Seats (450) 
National Congress Party (NCP) 323 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 99 
Popular Congress Party (PCP)  4 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 4 
Umma Federal Party (UFP) 3 
Umma Renewal and Reform Party (URRP) 2 
Democratic Unionist Party-Original (DUPO) 2 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Democratic Change (SPLM-
DC) 
2 
Others  4 
Independents 3 
Vacant 4 
 
3.	  Failure	  of	  the	  Peace	  Processes	  	  
The third factor that contributed to the South’s secession is the failure of the peace 
processes. The purpose of the various peace agreements was to erode any secessionist 
sentiments through ensuring equitable political, economic, and social rights. The 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement was to encompass all of the provisions necessary to 
provide attractive unity to the South. As was mentioned above, the democratic terms of 
the CPA were not met. However, besides the democratic failure of the CPA, there were 
other serious concerns.  
Apropos the power sharing stipulations, the power asymmetry between the NCP 
and SPLM allowed the NCP to hinder the application of the CPA’s constitutional 
arrangements and the democratic transition in general (as aforementioned the NCP held 
52 percent of all governmental institutions). Federal arrangements, in which one order 
clearly dominates are unlikely to succeed. The party was aware of its potency. A 
representative of the NCP said that “[...] we (the NCP) have the cards of the game in our 
hands and we have to trust other groups if we want to share the cards with them. We have 
as well the power to organize elections or not.”169 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Hartog,	  24.	  
	   67	  
One year after the INC was enacted, the NCP’s intention to prevent power sharing 
was obvious. Many international observers recorded this.  A representative of the 
Friedrich Erbert Stiftung academic foundation asserted that Al-Bashir and his party tried 
to hinder the implementation of the power sharing agreements to the extent that it was not 
confrontational but enough to thwart political change.170 For example, The NCP was slow 
in implementing important CPA provisions and still followed a somewhat unilateral 
approach.  Many key institutions such as the National Human Rights Commission were 
not established, more importantly, the national reconciliation and healing processes were 
not launched. There was also lack of progress on the issues of the census, elections, 
Abyei, and border demarcation, all vital components of the CPA.  
 The NCP’s disinterest in genuine power sharing caused particular resentment 
within the SPLM.  As a result, on October 2007, the SPLM froze its engagement in the 
GNU for two and a half months.171  The SPLM recalled its ministers, state ministers and 
presidential advisers from the GNU. The SPLM also announced that it would 
recommence participation in the GNU only after these issues had been resolved. The 
SPLM rejoined when Al-Bashir reshuffled his cabinet and promised new SPLM 
ministers, presidential advisors and state ministers.  However, power-sharing was not 
completely absent. On August 2011, state official and an SPLM-North opposition leader 
both cited this.172 The SPLM-North member suggested that the majority of power sharing 
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specifications were implemented (about 80 percent) and that the SPLM fulfilled the 28 
percent share promised in the GNU’s institutions.173   
As for the implementation of the cultural entente, Salva Kiir, the GoSS president 
spoke of clear divergence from its provisions, which were instrumental in providing 
attractive unity to the South. Salva Kiir said, “There was no respect for ethnic and 
religious diversity.”174  Atem Garang, the Deputy Chairperson of the GoSS Legislative 
Assembly, claimed that Southerners in the North were not protected against religious 
discrimination. Garang also pointed to the many hostile statements made by Northern 
religious leaders against the Southerners and the CPA. Many of these comments were 
provocative and highly criticized aspects of the cultural entente.175  For example, Garang 
said,  “When we (SPLM) arrived to Khartoum in 2005, there was a fatwa (religious 
decree) stating that the SPLM is an infidel movement, and who ever deals with it will be 
an apostate,” and that the NCP did not respond to it or any other similar statements. The 
nonchalance of the NCP reflected the party’s disinterest in making unity attractive. Al-
Bashir always favoured his Islamic hardliners and even gave them numerous ministerial 
and parliamentary posts.176 Surrounding himself with controversial hardliners, Al-Bashir 
prevented cooperation and frustrated the Southerners.  
The southerners were most frustrated with the problematic implementation of the 
oil-sharing protocol. It was its questionable application that almost led to the collapse of 
the entire CPA in 2007 when the SPLM froze its participation in the GNU. Salva Kiir 
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spoke repeatedly of clear contravention of the fifty-fifty share indicated in the CPA. He 
stated that the GoSS received about 26 percent of oil revenues not knowing where the rest 
went.177 The lack of transparency in the oil sector and the disagreements on the North-
South border, that up to this day are not finalized, enabled the NCP to deviate from the 
50-50 quotas. During most of the interim period, 2005-2011, both the ministers of finance 
and energy were NCP members and did not fully disclose oil revenue information.178 
Global Witness, a London-based group that advocates against natural resource-related 
conflict and corruption, noted the contentious oil sharing implementation.179 It argued 
that, “the Sudanese government and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), 
which runs the largest oil-extraction operation in the country, have failed to explain 
significant discrepancies in oil production numbers.”180 This led many to suspect that the 
government in the North was concealing oil revenues from the GoSS.  
The contravention of the CPA’s wealth-sharing, power-sharing and cultural 
provisions proved to the Southerners the historical fact that Khartoum cannot be trusted. 
One author stated, “Sudan is notorious for many agreements dishonoured,”181 which has 
led to substantial and profound distrust between the parties. From the Southerners’ 
perspective, secession was inevitable. Despite how good the deal may be, history shows 
that the government had and would breach the deal.  
 In addition to Al-Bashir (1989 to present), the two previous Sudanese presidents, 
Jaafar Numeri (1969-1985) and democratically elected Al-Mahdi (1986-1989) have 	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breached promises and treaties ratified with the South.  Jaafar Numeri contravened The 
Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983. Al-Mahdi reneged on the Koka Dam Agreement signed 
in 1986 with the SPLA.182 The Koka Dam aimed for a Sudan "free from racism, 
tribalism, sectarianism and all causes of discrimination and disparity.”183  It also included 
the repeal of Shariah and the institutionalization of secularism. Although most political 
parties supported the Koka Dam, the two most prominent parties, the Democratic 
Unionist Party and the National Islamic Front, refused to ratify it. In forthcoming 
negotiations Al-Mahdi, who may have been forced by his strong opposition and his 
fragile government, insisted on the continuation of Shariah in the North. This clearly 
violated the provisions of the Koka Dam.  
To a large extent, by contravening the peace treaties, the various Sudanese 
governments reinforced the gravity of the situation.  In his visit to Sudan in 1964, the 
historian Arnold Toybee noted that the situation between the North and the South 
required from the more powerful and developed Northern Sudan to show “inexhaustible 
patience, forbearance, and generosity, and immense understanding and sympathy.184” 
However, since independence, most of the governments in Khartoum viewed the South’s 
armed struggle as a rebellion that needed to be suppressed. Khartoum showed little 
generosity and even less patience.  
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4.	  Historical	  Grievances	  
The fourth factor that led to the secession in the case of South Sudan is the 
existence of deep-rooted historical grievances. Pavkovic and Radan stressed this factor in 
their conceptual paradigm and stated that it is one of the most reliable indicators of 
secession. For Southern Sudanese, historical grievances and the failure of reconciliation 
magnified the cultural barriers. A mid-age Southerner, describing his feelings about the 
unity of Sudan said, “In every Southern house, whether Muslim or Christian, someone 
has been lost to the war.”185 
 Around 2.5 million were killed in Africa’s longest civil war, most of whom were 
Southerners. Another 4.5 million were displaced and millions more were affected by 
post-war natural crises such as famines.186 The Southern Sudanese have faced 
tremendous suffering. This suffering has been cognitively linked to the North. Another 
young Southern man leaving Khartoum and heading to the South before the referendum 
said, “If they treated us good, none of this would have happened.”187 Moreover, the 
Southerners who lived in the North often felt constant humiliation and racism. Most of 
the Southerners working in the North were treated like menials. The majority of Southern 
Sudanese place the onus of humiliation, ghastly killings, underdevelopment, poverty, and 
marginalization on the North. One man said describing his support for secession, “to be 
free, to be free, to be no longer slaves.”188 Undoubtedly, these factors prompted the 
Southerners to vote for independence.  
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Secession became inevitable with the death of the Southern leader John Garang. 
He was one of the few Southerners who had faith in a united Sudan. He died six months 
after the ratification of the CPA in a plane crash (cause of the crash remains unclear). The 
advent of a pro-secessionist leader, Salva Kiir, made secession unpreventable. Kiir’s 
influence, charisma and political capabilities were not equivalent to Garang’s. He lacked 
Garang’s sophisticated education, sway and diplomacy skills. The relations with 
Khartoum deteriorated after Garang’s death, after which Kiir spoke of secession publicly.  
Garang’s role as a charismatic and visionary leader in the development of Sudan’s 
affairs was enormous. Since he assumed power in the early 1980’s as the leader of the 
second rebellion, his dream of a united secular Sudan was unflinching.   His commitment 
to the idea of a united secular Sudan explains the inability of many international actors 
involved in the CPA peace talks between the North and the South to foresee secession.  A 
Sudanese academic and federal advisor suggested in an interview, “the network of IGAD 
was certain of Garang’s personality and his views (including his vision to united Sudan)” 
and so secession was not expected.189 Most of the Southerners were pro-secessionists and 
the weak belief in Garang’s vision of a united, secular, and Africanist Sudan ended with 
his death.   
5.	  International	  Factors	  	  
The last factor that contributed to the secession of South Sudan is international 
support. Foreign intervention is an important pillar of Young and Heraclides’ theory of 
separatism. They propose that if the central government is unable to accommodate the 
demands of the secessionist movement and if the movement succeeds in mustering 	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enough public support then only international support is needed to achieve secession. The 
South received tremendous amount of support from the various regional and international 
actors in the periods of the first and second civil wars. It was this support that enabled the 
South to gain de facto secession.  
The support that the South received from neighbouring countries was significant. 
Uganda has proven to be a devoted friend to the South. Ugandan support to Anyanya 
created ground for the first civil war. In 1986, Yoweri Museveni came to power, a long-
time friend of Garang’s, and Uganda continued to extend its hands to the SPLA/M. 
Uganda always accused Khartoum of supporting Ugandan rebel groups such as the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Nile West Bank Liberation Front and the Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF), and as a result supported the SPLM.190 	  
Ethiopia is another close regional ally to South Sudan. Addis-Ababa is much 
closer to Juba than Khartoum. In fact, the Addis-Ababa-Khartoum relation is inconsistent 
at best. It is perhaps the most complicated in the region. However, Roland Marchal states, 
“These (Khartoum-Addis relations) dictate the future stability of the Horn of Africa.191”In 
the first civil war, Ethiopia supported Anyanya. This was perhaps a cause or an effect of 
Khartoum’s support to the Eritreans since the mid 1960s. Sudan sheltered tens of 
thousands of Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees. Khartoum also assisted various rebel 
groups. In the last few decades, Khartoum supported the Eritrean People’s Liberation 
Front (EPLF), the Tigrinya People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Oromo Liberation 	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Front (OLF) and the Ogden liberators in the South. This was a strategic move since all 
the above-mentioned groups are considered to be ethnic rebel groups in Ethiopia.  
 In the 1980s, Khartoum and Addis-Ababa’s tensions reached their peak. The two 
countries were not on the same side of the cold war. While Sudan was turning to 
America, Mengistu’s communist ideology affiliated him with the Soviets. In turn, he 
supported the SPLA/M, which claimed a socialist ideology. Ethiopia provided shelter for 
Southern refugees as well as military facilities for SPLA/M recruiting and training.192  
Regime change in both Khartoum and Addis Ababa around the same time (1989 
and 1991 respectively) provided an opportunity for an alliance between the two countries.  
Just when relations started to improve after the overthrow of Mengistu, tensions escalated 
again due to the Sudanese involvement in the assassination attempt of Egyptian president 
Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995 and Al-Bashir’s crusading Islamist policies in 
the region.  Soon after the SPLA/M was allowed back into Ethiopia.193  
Internationally, Al-Bashir’s NIF not only supported Islamists in the region but 
also in other parts of the world.194  It is said that the NIF supported the Islamists in 
Algeria and it is confirmed that Al-Bashir fell for Saddam’s rhetoric of Islamism and 
backed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In the early 1990s, Al-Bashir also provided a safe 
haven for Osama Bin Laden for a few years. This was in addition to building ties with 
Iran.195 Khartoum’s Islamist agenda multiplied its adversaries, especially with the U.S. as 
it was encountering terrorist attacks in 1990s.  America quickly placed Sudan on the State 
Sponsor of Terrorism list.  The U.S. also rushed into backing Uganda, Ethiopia and 
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Eritrea’s containment of Sudan. The support reached its climax in the mid 1990s as the 
three countries became the U.S. ‘frontline states’ in the war on Sudan’s Islamists. The 
U.S. in return provided them with military assistance.  
Al-Bashir’s crusading policies also repelled Eritrea, an ally before such policies 
took effect. Although Khartoum’s support was the main reason that the EPLF and 
Eritrean nationalists were able to achieve victory, the relations began to sour soon after 
Eritrea’s independence. Eritrea’s fear that Khartoum would try to destabilize Asmara by 
its Islamist regional agenda turned Khartoum from a friend to a suspicious adversary.196  
Relations exacerbated when Khartoum started to meddle in Eritrea’s domestic affairs 
through supporting groups who made claims about power-sharing such as the Bani Amir 
(who live on the Sudan-Eritrea border and who are well-represented in Al-Bashir’s 
regime). 
Al-Bashir’s Islamist agenda also had an impact on Sudan’s relations with its Arab 
neighbours, Egypt and Libya. Libya was another country that provided support for the 
SPLA/M. Gaddafi supported both sides sporadically. Until the fall of Numeri, Gaddafi 
backed the South as he viewed the SPLA/M as a liberation movement. Al-Mahdi regime, 
that followed the overthrow of Numeri government, was more amiable towards Gaddafi. 
The positive relations between the governments persuaded Gaddafi to switch sides and 
support Al-Mahdi until his fall in 1989.  After the fall, Gaddafi welcomed Al-Bashir but 
soon grew wary of his Islamist agenda.  
Relations between Egypt and Al-Bashir’s Islamist government are marked by 
historic tensions.  All three Egyptian military regimes (Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak) had a 	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reputation of purging and quashing Egyptian Islamists. As a result of this history, the new 
Sudanese Islamist regime in 1989 had a negative impression of Egypt’s political class. 
The assassination attempt of Mubarak deteriorated the relationship further, leaving Sudan 
with very few friends in the region.197 Egypt’s interest in Sudan was twofold. The first 
was water and the second was in the containment of Islamists. The first led Cairo to 
support Khartoum. Cairo was afraid that the creation of another Nile basin country (the 
South) would complicate the issue of water sharing between the basin countries. 
Approximately 95 percent of Egyptians rely on The Nile for water.  
All of the above countries advanced different peace initiatives that would best suit 
their interests. There were two peace initiatives in the 1990s and early 2000s: a Libyan-
Egyptian initiative that focused on Sudan’s unity and an Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) peace initiative that focused on secularism and to a degree self-
determination. IGAD includes Eritrea (withdrew 2007), Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, and 
Somalia and is headed by Ethiopia. The primary assertion of IGAD was to weaken the 
Islamist government in Khartoum and not necessarily the secession of South Sudan. 
Rogier stated that promoting secularism was the core of IGAD’s strategy “secularism was 
seen as an antidote to political Islam and a possible way towards overthrowing 
Khartoum’s Islamist regime.198”  
IGAD’s peace initiative would overshadow the Libyan-Egyptian peace attempt. 
This was due to western support for IGAD, especially from the United States. IGAD 
pressured Khartoum to sign an incredibly decentralized system of governance that 
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severed much of its power and weakened it substantially.  The amount of authority that 
was given to the South under the CPA was on par with an independent state. First, there 
was no presence of Sudanese military in the South. Second, the oil was shared equally 
between Khartoum and Juba. Third, Khartoum was not allowed to have direct contact 
with any of the Southern governors (other than the president of the GoSS). Moreover, the 
CPA allowed South Sudan to have consulates in every capital around the world. A state 
official gave two reasons for Khartoum’s acquiescence to the CPA, “first Khartoum’s 
negotiators were no match to the international negotiators (almost less in competency), 
and second international pressure was tremendous.”199  
The international community and many Sudanese, Northerners and Southerners 
together, also believe that the NCP ratified the agreement for its survival, improved 
relations with the United States, and to feed its insatiable patrimonial cycle. Thus, the 
NCP’s commitment to the CPA was less of a commitment to democracy and peace and 
more of a manoeuvre to stay in power. 
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to analyse each of the factors that contributed to South 
Sudan’s secession. Horowitz, Wood and Smith stressed the determining role of 
assimilationist agendas, economic discrimination, and political exclusion in inciting 
separatism. Khartoum carried similar policies and as such regional groups, particularly 
the South, rebelled. Khartoum’s policies, including Arabization and economic and 
political marginalization, comprise the first determining factor of South Sudan’s 
secession.  	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 The second factor that contributed to the secession of South Sudan is the 
weakness of Sudan’s democratic governments. Wood, Elazar and Lijphart all asserted the 
likelihood of civil discord and separatism in the absence of effective democratic 
governments. The Sudanese democracies failed to restructure the country on equitable 
political, social, and economic grounds and as such they were not different from the 
former authoritarian regimes. As Khartoum’s democracies failed, its legitimacy 
substantially decreased and the South continued on its battle for independence.  
The failure of the peace processes is the third factor responsible for the secession 
of South Sudan. The contravention of the various peace processes through out the history 
of Sudan proved to the South that peace was unattainable with Khartoum.  The 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement was the most salient peace treaty. Unfortunately, it had 
failed to fulfil any of its goals, attractive unity or peace.  
The implementation of the peace processes was problematic and as such 
contributed to the fourth factor, historical grievances and distrust. Pavkovic and Radans’ 
conceptual paradigm emphasizes the role of historical grievances in secession. This is 
clearly seen through the South’s case as it witnessed untold tales of suffering and 
discrimination during its unity with Sudan. Secession for them marked the beginning of 
liberation.     
International community’s support to South Sudan is what helped it gain de facto 
secession and is the last and fifth factor. As in Young and Heraclides’ paradigm, foreign 
support is an essential factor for the actualization of secession. The South received 
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tremendous amount of support from its regional and western allies, all of whom placed 
great pressure on Khartoum to grant the South the right to self-determination 
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The growth of secessionist movements and secessionist rhetoric is often an 
indicator of civil discord. Scholars have written extensively about the rise of secessionist 
movements and have indicated that it is a multifactorial product. This thesis holds that 
five factors are chiefly responsible for secession in the case of Sudan. The factors are: the 
impact of the Northern Arabs’ policies, the weakness of Sudan’s democratic experiments, 
the failure of the peace processes, the existence of entrenched historical grievances, and 
the role of international actors.   The aforementioned factors led to the secession of South 
Sudan, creating Africa’s youngest nation in July 2011 and thus as in Wood’s theory; 
South Sudan’s secession is a result of an amalgamation of a series of dynamic 
‘conditions. 
Khartoum’s assimilationist agenda and severe political and economic exclusion 
propelled the Southerners in the direction of secession. The call for secession was only 
muted when there was a halt to the assimilationist policies and when fair power and 
wealth sharing were present. International pressure was behind the two peace agreements, 
The Addis Ababa Agreement and the CPA, both of which entailed a decentralized model 
of governance that guaranteed cultural rights, wealth and power sharing.  The 
international role played in the unfolding of Sudan’s domestic affairs was significant, 
starting at the beginning with the colonization of the British.  
Colonial power impacted Sudan in two ways. First, it drew borders that were 
extremely incompatible with the diversity it contained. Second, it empowered specific 
groups creating patterns of social and economic disparity. Both decisions shaped Sudan’s 
development in the decades following independence. The British focused on the most 
profitable and least demanding investments, such as economic development in Northern 
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Sudan. This was because the Northern Arabs and Nubian tribes already had schooling 
systems with writing technology and fertile land for agriculture.200 When the colonials 
granted Sudan independence, the Northern Arabs seized power since they were politically 
organized and relatively more developed than other peripheral groups. An eventual 
transfer to the Arabs of all-administrative, economic and social institutions followed. 
The Northern Arabs were determined to build Sudan on an Arab-Islamic 
orientation and they continued an economic development pattern similar to that of the 
British.201 Some groups did not welcome this Arab-Islamic vision of the country. 
Southern Sudanese, who were governed by a separate administration system under 
colonialism, in particular had an aversion to Arabization. Prior to independence, they 
pressed for a decentralized system of governance and Khartoum’s dismissal of any 
federal model triggered the first civil war. 
The militant Abboud regime (1958-64) formulated and implemented rigid 
assimilationist policies and this led to the intensification of war and increased the 
popularity of Anyanya I. The civilian government that inherited power after Abboud’s 
departure allowed for a political opening and facilitated national dialogue. The 
Southerners responded accordingly by creating political parties, organizations and by 
participating in the national dialogue. The Northern Arab elite, pressured by national 
elections, proposed yet another Arab assimilationist agenda. Once again, in response to 
Arabization, a civil war broke out. 	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The failure of the democratic government led to another military coup headed by 
Numeri. Numeri’s socialist ideology allowed him to accommodate some of the 
Southerners’ demands through The Addis Ababa Agreement. However, it was 
international pressure that compelled Numeri and Anyanya I to the negotiation table. 
Numeri’s purge of many leftists severed his Soviet support and his agreements with 
neighbouring countries severed support from Anyanya. As both sides found themselves 
bereft of all support, their only option was peace. The Addis Ababa Agreement provided 
eleven years of peace. However, its abrogation that was partially orchestrated by the 
Islamists in Khartoum led to the second civil war and the creation of the SPLA/M. 
Emeric Rogier suggested, “While in 1956 Southerners were not granted the special 
arrangements that they had been promised, in 1983 they had taken back from them what 
they had been conceded eleven years earlier.”202  
The SPLA/M was more of an ideological movement than a secessionist one. 
Moreover, it displayed puissant military skills. This made an agreement between Al-
Mahdi, the head of the elected government after the removal of Numeri, and the South 
less probable. Instead of liberating the South, the SPLA/M thought to liberate all of 
Sudan and turn it into an African-secular nation. Therefore, the SPLA/M rejected the idea 
of Shariah even within a federal setting. 
The coup of 1989 changed the course of the war dramatically. To date, the Bashir 
government has been the most radical Arab-Islamist government. The government’s 
aggressive and crusading policies turned it into a national and international pariah. In the 
late 1990’s, Khartoum’s tensions with its non-Arab neighbours reached its peak. Uganda, 	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Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Chad supported various rebel groups in Sudan (including the 
SPLA/M) simultaneously.  In 1997, Khartoum faced multiple rebel armies who worked 
together under one commander backed by neighbouring Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and 
Chad. Beyond the regional picture, the United States was providing support for Sudan’s 
neighbours as part of its containment of the Islamist ideology. The mounting pressure led 
Khartoum to reconsider some of its domestic and international policies. Eventually the 
National Congress Party was pressured into negotiating the CPA with the SPLA/M. 
The aim of the CPA was to provide attractive unity to the South, however its 
application was poor and some of its elements were not implemented.203 The CPA 
represented yet another unfulfilled agreement.  The contravention of The Addis Ababa 
Agreement, the Koka Dam Agreement, some of The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
provisions and other agreements with Southern factions engraved nothing in the South 
but mistrust.  Taking all the factors into account, the Southerners voted for secession 
hoping they would end a protracted war of which they were the victims.  
Internal	  Unrest	  
Sudan’s situation is much more difficult since conflicts are not confined between 
the North and the South. Each of the two regions, with Khartoum and Juba in the lead, 
has its own complex internal challenges. Khartoum’s core problems have been 
illuminated earlier. In the North, dissent remains widespread as regional 
underdevelopment, underrepresentation and marginalization still characterize the centre-
peripheral relations. Khartoum is still trying to contain the Darfur crisis and the recent 
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war with rebels in South Kordofan state.204 The South faces menacing challenges as well. 
In 2010, U.S. intelligence stated "Over the next five years, a number of countries in 
Africa and Asia are at significant risk for a new outbreak of mass killing…among these 
countries, a new mass killing or genocide is most likely to occur in Southern Sudan."205 
On South Sudan’s independence other sources stated that the country has never been as 
close to civil war. 
Today, Juba and Khartoum are very similar. Both of the dominant political parties 
are hostile to a genuine political opening and democracy.  Juba has parallel central-
peripheral issues with its share of marginalization and transgression. The Southern Dinka 
tribe has always dominated the SPLA and has consistently alienated smaller regional 
tribes. SPLA/M’s transgression is best understood in the historical context of the alliances 
and enmities that formed during the civil war. May Ying Welsh writes, “sometimes, 
whole tribal territories became affiliated with one side or the other, and the vicious North-
South war became a defining factor in relations between tribes, infusing old hostilities 
with a new political dimension.”206 Substantial mistrust therefore exists between the 
SPLA and smaller tribes. 
On March 2009, according to the Murle tribe, 700 members were killed when 
thousands of Nuer and Dinka attacked Murle villages to steal cattle. This is common as 
there are similar incidents reported to this day. In 2010, reports indicated that villages in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  204	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  Thomas,	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  Interdependence,”	  The	  World	  Today.org	  (2010)	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  205	  Michael	  Abramowitz	  and	  Lawrence	  Woocher,	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  Security	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  Foreign	  Policy,	  accessed	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  accessed	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the Shilluk kingdom of Southern Sudan were also attacked and burned. Survivors and 
victims said that the army, SPLA, raped, tortured, and killed hundreds of women, 
children, men, elders and members of the royal family. Over 10,000 people had to flee 
into the forest in the middle of the rainy season, without proper clothing, bedding, shelter 
or food. It is reported that many children have died from hunger and cold.207 The UN and 
other organizations have reported similar incidents of human rights violations. In fact, an 
international aid agency director in Juba said, "human rights abuses off the Richter scale, 
happen in the South.”208 
Political	  Reform:	  Decentralization	  and	  Democracy	  
Given the current state of South and North Sudan, conflict is likely to continue 
and further secession is not improbable. The leaders of both the North and the South need 
to decide on whether they would like to continue on a path that has failed or follow a 
more promising path of democracy, equity and decentralization. Only these elements can 
reconcile and address Sudan’s diversity in the South and the North. Lessons should be 
mustered from the CPA experiment and both Juba and Khartoum need to strive for a 
successful inclusive federal model characterized by balanced federal techniques, sound 
federal culture and just federal politics. 
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Appendix	  	  
 
Table No. (1) 
 
Regional population distribution and regional ranking by population size from 1973-1983-1993-2008 
censuses209 
SUDAN 
Region 
1993 
(Rank) population (000), % 
1983 
(Rank) population (000), % 
1973 
(Rank) population (000), % 
Northern Region  (7) 1293    (5.1) (9) 1084  (5.3) (7) 918   (6.5) 
Khartoum (3) 3512    (13.7) (6) 1802   (8.7) (6) 1096  (7.8) 
Central region  
Eastern region 
(1) 5433    (21.2) 
(5) 3067    (12.00) 
(1) 4022   (19.6) 
(5) 2209   (10.7) 
(1) 3623  (25.7) 
(4) 1497  (10.6) 
Kordofan  
Darfur 
Bahr Alghazal 
(4) 3323    (13.0) 
(2) 4638    (18.1) 
(6) 1913    (7.5) 
(3) 3091   (15.3) 
(2) 3112   (15.3) 
(4) 2271   (11.0) 
(2) 2098  (14.9) 
(3) 2077  (4.7) 
(5) 1322  (9.4) 
Upper Nile  
Equatoria 
(8) 1258,    (4.9) 
(9) 1150,    (4.5) 
(7) 1595    (7.7) 
(8) 1408   (6.8) 
(8) 761    (5.4) 
(9) 722    (5.1) 
Source: central bureau of statistics 
Analytical report, 1993 	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Table No. (3) 
Summary of the Sudanese Regimes 211 
 Build-up 
Period 
Catalyst for 
change 
Issues  Major Actors Tools and 
means 
1953-58 1st 
Democratic 
period 
Relatively long 
from 1948-53 
1953 self-rule 
Agreement 
Independence Britain, Egypt, 
Northern 
parties  
Negotiations 
1958-64 Military 
Regime 
Long period Military coup Islamization and 
Arabization 
Anyanya I War 
1964-69 
Transitional 
period and 2nd 
Democratic 
period 
Short period Student 
demonstrations 
Islamization and 
Arabization  
Anyanya I War 
1969-1985 
Military Regime-
71 and one party 
state-85 
Long period Military Coup North-South 
Addis Ababa 
peace agreement 
Anyanya I and 
Numeri 
government 
Negotiations 
and mediation 
1986-1989 3rd 
Democratic 
Period 
Short period Urban unrest and 
labour union 
strikes 
Economy and 
North-South 
Issue 
Mahdi gov’t & 
SPLM 
Negotiations 
and war 
1989-1999 
Military regime, 
One Party state 
Long period Military coup  Islamization and 
Arabization 
SPLM and 
Bashir gov’t 
War 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  Ibid.	  	  211	  Atta	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Table No. (4) 
 
13-23 December 2000 Presidential Election*/**212 
Registered Voters 12,000,000 (approx.) 
Total Votes (Voter Turnout) Not Available 
Candidate Party        % Of Votes 
Omar Hassan Al-Bashir (NCP) 86.5% 
Jaafar Nimeiri (APWF) 9.6% 
Malik Hussain 1.6% 
Al-Samuel Hussein Osman Mansour (LD) 1.3% 
Mahmoud Ahmed Juna 1.0% 
*The election was boycotted by most of the major opposition parties. 
**Voting did not take place in three Southern states that were under rebel control. 
 
Table No. (5) 
 
13-23 December 2000 National Assembly Election*/**213 
Registered Voters 12,000,000 (approx.) 
Total Votes (Voter Turnout) Not Available 
Party Number of Seats (360) 
National Congress Party (NCP) 355 
Independents 5 
*The election was boycotted by most of the major opposition parties. 
**Voting did not take place in three Southern states that were under rebel control.  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  212	  “Sudan,”	  African	  Election	  Databases,	  accessed	  Oct.	  2010,	  http://africanelections.tripod.com/sd.html	  	  213	  Ibid.	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Table No. (6) 
 
- Sudanese Government - Regional Representation (%)214 
 
Regions States Population  
Share  
(%, 2001) 
Regimes      
   Abboud  
1954-64 
(Military)  
Second 
Democracy 
1964-69 
Numeri 
(Military)  
1969-85 
Transitional Military 
Council  
1985-86 
Third 
Democracy  
(Al-Mahdi)  
1986-89 
Revolutionary 
Command Council 
(Al Bashir)  
June 1989 
Eastern Gedharif        
 Kassala 11.7 1.4 2.05 2.5 0 2.6 0 
 Red Sea        
Northern Northern River Nile 4.7 79 67.9 68.7 70 47.4 66.7 
Central Blue Nile        
 Gezira        
 Khartoum 36.9 2.8 6.2 16.5 10 14.7 0 
 Sinnar        
 White Nile        
Southern Bahr Al-Ghazal        
 Equatorial 16.0 16 17.3 7.8 16.7 12.9 13.3 
 Upper Nile        
Western Darfur        
 Kordofan 30.6 0 6.2 3.5 3.3 22.4 20 
   
Table No. (7) 
Sudan’s Democratic Periods215  
 Build-up Period Catalyst for change Issues  Major Actors Tools and 
means 
1953-58 1st 
Democratic 
period 
Relatively long 
from 1948-53 
1953 self-rule 
Agreement 
Independence Britain, Egypt, 
Northern parties  
Negotiations 
1958-64 Military 
Regime 
Long period Military coup Islamization and 
Arabization 
Anyanya I War 
1964-69 
Transitional period 
and 2nd 
Democratic 
period 
Short period Student 
demonstrations 
Islamization and 
Arabization  
Anyanya I War 
1969-1985 Military 
Regime-71 and one 
party state-85 
Long period Military Coup North-South 
Addis Ababa 
peace agreement 
Anyanya I and 
Numeri 
government 
Negotiations 
and mediation 
1986-1989 3rd 
Democratic 
Period 
Short period Urban unrest and 
labour union strikes 
Economy and 
North-South Issue 
Mahdi gov’t & 
SPLM 
Negotiations 
and war 
1989-1999 
Military regime, 
One Party state 
Long period Military coup  Islamization and 
Arabization 
SPLM and 
Bashir gov’t 
War 
2000-2005 
Restricted 
Democratic 
Practice 
Medium period Oil, international 
pressure 
North-South  
Darfur 
SPLM, NCP 
(Khartoum 
Gov’t), IGAD 
N-S -
Negotiations 
Darfur - War 
2005-2011 4th 
Democratic 
Period 
Medium Period Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement 
North-South SPLM, NCP, 
IGAD 
Negotiations 
and Secession  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  	  Cobham,	  	  464.	  215	  Atta	  El-­‐Battahani,	  35.	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Table No. (8)  
11-15 April 2010 Presidential Election216 
Registered voters 16,500,000 
Total Votes (Voter Turnout) N/A 
Invalid/Blank Votes N/A 
Total Valid Votes 10,114,310 
Candidate (Party) Number of Votes % of Votes 
Omar Hassan al-Bashir (NCP) 6,901,694 68.24% 
Yasir Arman (SPLM) 2,193,826 21.69% 
Abdullah Deng Nhial (PCP) 396,139 3.92% 
Hatim Al-Sir (DUP) 195,668 1.93% 
Others _____ 4.22% 
Prior to the election being held, a total of five candidates had withdrawn from the race: Yasir Arman, Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Hatim Al-Sir, 
Mubarak Al-Fadil, and Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud. Their names, however, remained on the ballot and each gained votes. 
 
Table No.  (9) 
11-15 April 2010 National Assembly Election217 
Registered Voters 16,500,00 (approx) Total Voters N/A 
Party  Number of Seats (450) 
National Congress Party (NCP) 323 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 99 
Popular Congress Party (PCP)  4 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 4 
Umma Federal Party (UFP) 3 
Umma Renewal and Reform Party (URRP) 2 
Democratic Unionist Party-Original (DUPO) 2 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Democratic Change (SPLM-
DC) 
2 
Others  4 
Independents 3 
Vacant 4 	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